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ABSTRACT
Essays on Monetary Policy and Banking Regulation. (August 2004)
Jingyuan Li, Diploma; M.S., Huazhong University of Science and
Technology
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Guoqiang Tian

A central bank is usually assigned two functions: the control of inflation and the maintenance of a safety-banking sector. What are the precise
conditions under which trigger strategies from the private sector can solve
the time inconsistency problem and induce the central bank to choose zero
inflation under a nonstationary natural rate? Can an optimal contract be
used together with reputation forces to implement a desired socially optimal
monetary policy rule? How to design a truth-telling contract to control the
risk taking behaviors of the bank? My dissertation attempts to deal with
these issues using three primary methodologies: monetary economics, game
theory and optimal stochastic control theory.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation studies several problems of monetary policy and banking regulation.
There are three essays in this dissertation. The first essay develops a
model to examine the equilibrium behavior of the time inconsistency problem in a continuous time economy with stochastic nature rate and endogenized distortion. The second essay studies the time inconsistency problem
on monetary policy for central banks using a unified approach that combines
reputation forces and contracts. In the third essay, we study how to control
the risk taking behaviors of the bank.
Chapter II develops a model to examine the equilibrium behavior of
the time inconsistency problem in a continuous time economy with stochastic nature rate and endogenized distortion. First, we introduce the notion
of sequentially rational equilibrium, and show that the time inconsistency
problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies for stochastic setting. We provide the conditions for the existence of sequentially rational
equilibrium. Then the concept of sequentially rational stochastically stable
equilibrium is introduced. We compare the relative stability between the
cooperative behavior and uncooperative behavior and show that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational
stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium in this
The journal model is Journal of Economic Theory.
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monetary policy game is sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation monetary policies are inherently
more stable than the discretion rules, and once established, they tend to
persist for longer periods of the time.
Chapter III studies the time inconsistency problem on monetary policy
for central banks using a unified approach that combines reputation forces
and contracts. We first characterize the conditions for reputation forces to
eliminate the inflation bias of discretionary policy. We then propose an optimal contract that can be used with reputation forces to implement a desired
socially optimal monetary policy rule when the reputation forces alone are
not large enough to discourage a central bank to use a surprise inflation
policy. In contrast to most of the existing contracts that are contingent on
realized inflation rates which are in turn contingent on production shocks,
like the standard reputation model, a central banker in our hybrid mechanism
is punished only when she uses a surprise inflation rate. Since the penalty
proposed is the lowest one that discourages the central bank from attempting
to cheat and the sum of the loss, reputation forces, and the penalty for the
central bank to cheat is the same as the loss at the socially optimal inflation
rate, our hybrid mechanism is the most efficient and robust mechanism that
implements the socially optimal monetary policy rule. We also provide an
upper bound of the penalty that is lower than that of the existing contracts
when realized inflation rate is greater than a certain level.
Chapter IV studies how to control the risk taking behaviors of the bank.
First we get the expected bankruptcy time and conditional probability distribution of bankruptcy for a given time. We show that the risk-shifting
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behavior will increase the probability of bankruptcy during a given time.
Then we use these results to analyze the regulation policies and show that
capital requirements can not control the risk taking behaviors of bank at
finite future point in time. We also prove that if we use the time horizon
as an additional instrument, we can control the risk shifting problem. We
give a theoretic explanation for the VaR regulation. Finally, we discuss the
VaR contracts with asymmetric information and show that VaR contracts
can induce the banker report the real risk of the project.
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CHAPTER II

TIME INCONSISTENCY AND REPUTATION IN MONETARY
POLICY: A STRATEGIC MODELLING IN CONTINUOUS TIME
This chapter develops a model to examine the equilibrium behavior of
the time inconsistency problem in a continuous time economy with stochastic
and endogenized distortion. First, we introduce the notion of sequentially
rational equilibrium , and show that the time inconsistency problem may be
solved with trigger reputation strategies for stochastic setting. We provide
the conditions for the existence of sequentially rational equilibrium. Then
the concept of sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium is introduced. We compare the relative stability between the cooperative behavior
and uncooperative behavior and show that the cooperative equilibrium in
this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational stochastically stable
equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game
is sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run,
the zero inflation monetary policies are inherently more stable than the discretion rules, and once established, they tend to persist for longer periods of
the time.

A. Introduction
Time inconsistency is an interesting problem in macroeconomics in general, and monetary policy in particular. Although technologies, preferences,
and information are the same at different time, the policymaker’s optimal
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policy chosen at time t1 differs from the optimal policy for t1 chosen at
t0 < t1 . The study of time inconsistency is important. It not only provides
positive theories that help us to understand the incentives faced by policymakers and provides the natural starting point for attempts to explain the
actual behavior of policymakers and actual policy outcomes, but also requires
one to design policy-making institutions. Such a normative task can help one
understand how institutional structures affect policy outcomes.
This problem was first noted by Kydland and Prescott [20]. Several
solutions have been proposed to deal with this problem since then. Barro
and Gordon [4] were the first to build a game model to analyze “reputation”
of monetary policy.1 A second solution is based on the incentive contracting
approach to monetary policy. Persson and Tabellini [30], Walsh [41] and
Svensson [37] developed models using this approach. A third solution is
built on the legislative approach. The major academic contribution in this
area was by Rogoff [33].
Among these approaches, the “reputation” problem is key. If reputation
consideration discourages the monetary authorities from attempting surprise
inflation, then legal or contracting constraints on monetary authorities are
unnecessary and may be harmful.
The main questions on reputation are when and how the government
chooses inflation optimally to minimize welfare loss, and, whether the pun1

Backus and Driffill [2] extended the work of Barro and Gordon to a
situation in which the public is uncertain about the preferences of the government. Persson and Tabellini [29] gave an excellent summarization of these
models. Al-Nowaihi and Levine [1] discussed reputation equilibrium in the
Barro-Gordon monetary policy game.
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ishment can induce the government to choose zero inflation. The conclusions
of Barro-Gorden models are: First, there exists a zero-inflation Nash equilibrium if the punishment for the government deviating from zero-inflation
is large enough. However, this equilibrium is not sequentially rational over
a finite time horizon. The only sequentially rational equilibrium is achieved
if the government chooses discretionary inflation and the public expects it.
Only over an infinite time horizon can one get a low-inflation equilibrium.
Otherwise, the government would be sure in the last period to produce the
discretionary outcome whatever the public’s expectation were and, working
backward, would be expected to do the same in the first period. Second, there
are multiple Nash equilibria and there is no mechanism to choose between
them.
This chapter develops a continuous times model of central bank at the
spirit of Kydland and Prescott [20] and Barro and Gordon [4]. The main
differences between our model and previous models are the following two
assumptions:
(1) the natural rate is a Brownian motion;
(2) the distortion of the economy is correlated to the natural rate.
The reason we use assumption (1) is that the most recent literature
shares the view that the natural rate changes over time and specifies the
natural rate as a random walk without drift seems a plausible assumption
for U.S. unemployment data 2 .
The key aspect of this monetary time inconsistency problem is the dis2

See Staiger, Stock and Watson [39], and Salemi [34].
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tortion which arises from the labor-market distortions and the political pressure on the central bank. Most often, some appeal is made to the presence
of labor-market distortions, for example, a wage tax. So, it seems reasonable
for us to assume that the distortion is an increasing function of the scale of
the economy. We use an linear function to approximate this function in this
chapter.
In this chapter, we use the optimal stopping theory in the stochastic
differential equations literature to study the time inconsistency problem in
monetary policy with the continuous finite or infinite time horizon model.
The optimal stopping theory can cover many dynamic economic applications
under uncertainty. The optimal stopping theory, though relatively complete
in its theoretical development, has not yet been widely applied in economics.
By using the optimal stopping theory and introducing the notions of sequentially rational equilibria, we give the conditions under which the time
inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies. We
provide the conditions for the existence of sequentially rational equilibrium.
We argue that the tradition concepts of equilibrium are not satisfactory
as a predictor of long run behavior when the game is subjected persistent
stochastic shocks. The concept of sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium is introduced. Loosely speaking, the sequentially rational
stochastically stable equilibrium of a dynamic game are those equilibrium
that the expected time to apart from them is infinite. Then we compare the
relative stability between the cooperative behavior and uncooperative behavior and show that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game
is a sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncoop-
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erative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational
stochastically unstable equilibrium.
The results obtained in the chapter imply that, in the long run, the zero
inflation monetary policies are inherently more stable than the discretion
rules, and once established, they tend to persist for longer periods of the
time.
Whether or not we can expect the monetary policy to have a tendency
to become stable depends not only on the lifetime of the government, but
also on the beliefs of the government and the public, ceteris paribus. If the
time horizon is long enough, we may expect the monetary policy tends to
stable beyond some point of time. Although the initial economy shocks and
natural rate may not implement a stationary sequentially rational equilibrium
at the beginning, under the sequentially strong rational strategy behavior
assumption, the reputation trigger equilibrium have a tendency to reach a
new stationary equilibrium beyond some point in time. If the life time of the
government is not long enough to reach such a point, we may be able to use
an incentive contract or a legislative approach to reach it.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section B will set
up the model and provides a solution for the optimal stopping problem faced
by the government. In Section C, we study the equilibrium behavior. The
stochastic stability of this monetary game is discussed in Section D. Section
E gives the conclusion.
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B. Model
1. The Setup
We consider a continuous time game theoretical model with two players:
the government and the public. The government’s strategy space is R+ ×
L[0, T ], from which the government is to choose an action (τ, {πt }t∈T ). Here
τ is the time that the government changes its monetary policy from the
zero-inflation rule to a discretion rule; πt is the inflation rate chosen by the
government at time t; T is the lifetime of the government which can be finite
or infinite; and L[0, T ] is the class of Lebesgue integral functions defined on
[0, T ]. The public’s strategy space is L[0, T ], from which the public is to
choose an action ({πte }t∈T ). Here πte is the expected inflation rate formed by
the public at time t.
Suppose that, at the beginning, the government commits an inflation
rate π0 = 0, and the public believes it so that π0e = π0 = 0. The government
has the right to switch from the zero-inflation to a discretion rule πt 6= 0 at
the time t between 0 and T . However, after he changes his policy, he loses
his reputation.
The government’s loss function is described by a quadratic discounted
expected loss function of the form:
Z
Λ=E

T
−ρ·t

e
0




1
1 2
2
θ (yt − ȳt − kt ) + πt dt
2
2

(II.1)

where ρ is the discount factor with 0 < ρ < 1, yt is aggregate output, ȳt is
the economy’s natural rate of output, kt is the distortion which is equal αȳt
and α > 0. Some appeal is made to the presence of labor-market distortions,
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for example, a wage tax. Since a larger scale of a economy always implies a
larger wage tax, so, it seems reasonable for us to assume that the distortion is
an increasing function of the scale of the economy. We use an linear function
to approximate this function in this chapter.
θ is a positive constant that represents the relative weight the government puts on output expansions relative to inflation stabilization. Here, the
target inflation π is zero.3 (II.1) is a typical marco welfare function that has
played an important role in the literature, and means that the government
desires to stabilize both output around ȳt + kt , which exceeds the economy’s
equilibrium output of ȳt by kt , and inflation around zero.
Here we assume that y¯t = Xt and
dXt = σdBt ,

X0 = x,

which is a special case of the general Ito diffusion:
dXt = b(Xt )dt + σ(Xt )dBt
with b(X̄t ) = 0 and σ(X̄t ) = σ. Here, Bt is 1-dimensional Brownian motion
and σ is the diffusion coefficient with σ < ∞.
The government’s objective is to minimize this discounted expected loss
function subject to the constraint imposed by a Lucas-type aggregate supply function, the so-called Phillips curve, which describes the relationship
3

Without loss of generality, the target inflation rate is assumed to be zero.
The results obtained in the chapter will continue to be true if the monetary
authority has a target inflation that differs from zero.
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between output and inflation in each period:
yt − ȳt = a (πt − πte ) + ut ,

(II.2)

where a is a positive constant that represents the effect of a money surprise
on output, i.e., the rate of the output gain from the unanticipated inflation
so that the larger is a, the greater is the central bank’s incentive to inflate,
and ut is a bounded random variable with E[ut ] = 0, V ar[ut ] = σu2 , |ut | ≤ M1
for all t and cov(us , ut ) = 0, for t 6= s, which represents the shock at time
t. And we assume that ȳt and ut are independent. We also assume that the
government can observe ut and Xt prior to setting πt .
The public has complete information about the policymaker’s objectives.
It is assumed that the public forms his expectations rationally, and thus the
assumption of rational expectation implicitly defines the loss function for the
public as E[πt − πte ]2 . The public’s objective is to minimize this expected
inflation error. Given the public’s understanding of the government’s decision
problem, its choice of π e is optimal.
We first examine the “one-shot” game. The single-period loss function
`t for the government is:
1
1
θ (yt − ȳt − kt )2 + πt2
2
2
1
1
e
=
θ[a(πt − πt ) − αXt + ut ]2 + πt2 .
2
2

`t (πt , πte ) =

(II.3)

The equilibrium concept in this game is noncooperative Nash. Then the
government minimizes `t by taking πte as given, and thus we have the best
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response function for the policymaker:
πtD =

aθ
(aπte + αXt − ut ) .
1 + a2 θ

(II.4)

The public is assumed to understand the incentive facing the government so
they use (II.4) in forming their expectations about inflation so that
πte = EπtD =

aθ
(aπte + αEXt ) .
1 + a2 θ

(II.5)

Solving (II.5) for πte , we get the unique Nash equilibrium πte∗ = EπtD∗ =
aθαEXt . Thus, as long as EXt 6= 0, the policymaker has incentives to
use the discretion rule although the loss at πte = πt = 0 is lower than at
πte∗ = EπtD∗ .
A potential solution to the above time inconsistency problem is to force
the government to bear some consequence penalties if it deviates from its announced policy of low inflation. One of such penalties that may take is a loss
of reputation, and so, in this chapter, we will adopt the reputation approach
that incorporates notions of reputation into a repeated-game framework to
avoid this time consistency problem. If the government deviates from the
low-inflation solution, credibility is lost and the public expects high inflation
in the future. That is, the public expects zero-inflation as long as government
has fulfilled the inflation expectation in the past. However, if actual inflation exceeds what was expected, the public anticipates that the policymaker
will apply discretion in the future. So the public forms their expectation
according to the trigger strategy: Observing “good” behavior induces the
expectation of continued good behavior and a single observation of “bad”
behavior triggers a revision of expectations.
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2. The Optimal Stopping Problem for Government
In order to solve the time inconsistency problem by using the reputation
approach, we first incorporate the government’s loss minimization problem
into a general optimal stopping time problem. During any time in [0, T ],
the policymaker has the right to reveal his type (discretion or zero-inflation).
Since he has the right but not the obligation to reveal his type, we can think
it is an option for the policymaker. So the policymaker’s decision problem is
to choose a best time τ ∈ [0, T ] to exercise this option.
The policymaker considers the following time-inhomogeneous optimal
stopping problem: Find τ ∗ such that
∗

L (x) = inf E
τ

x

Z

τ


f (t, Xt )dt + g(τ, Xτ ) ,

(II.6)

0

where
1
f (s, Xt ) = θe−ρ·s (αXt − ut )2
2

(II.7)

is the instantaneous loss function for the policymaker when he uses the zeroinflation rate which is clearly Lipschits continuous, and
# #
"Z
"
T
D2
π
θ
g(s, Xτ ) = e−ρs E Xτ
e−ρ(t−s) [a(πtD − πte ) − αXt + ut ]2 + t
dt
2
2
s
(II.8)
is the expected loss function for policymaker in which he begin to use the
discretion rule at time s. Note that g(·) ≥ 0 since the loss function `t ≥ 0.
We assume that g(·) is a bounded function, i.e., g(·) ≤ M for some constant
number M .
Let {Ft } be a filtration, i.e., a nondecreasing family {Ft : t ≥ 0} of
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sub-σ-fields of F: Fs ⊂ Ft ⊂ F for 0 ≤ s < t < ∞, which is assumed to be
generated by the process itself, i.e., Ft := σ(Xs : 0 ≤ s ≤ t). Then, Ft can
be regarded the set of accumulated information up to time t.
We assume that the public’s strategy πte for t > τ is {Fτ }-adapted. This
means that when the public form their expectation at time t, they know the
natural rate at τ .
To compute g(τ, Xτ ), putting (II.4) into (II.8), we have
1
θ
g(τ, Xτ ) =
e−ρτ E Xτ
2
21+a θ

T

Z

−ρ(t−τ )

e

(αXt − ut +

aπte )2


dt (II.9)

τ

We now calculate the conditional expectation for Xt2 and Xt . Let A be the
of Ito diffusion dXt = b(Xt )dt + σ(Xt )dB (with b = 0). Then
Af =

X

bi

i

=


1X
∂2f
∂f
+
σσ T i,j
∂xi 2 i,j
∂xi ∂xj


1X
∂2f
σσ T i,j
2 i,j
∂xi ∂xj

Then, by Dynkin’s formula (Øksendal [27]), we have
E

Xτ

[Xt ] = Xτ + E

Xτ

t

Z


AXs ds = Xτ

(II.10)

= Xτ2 + σ 2 (t − τ ).

(II.11)

τ

E

Xτ

 2
Xt = Xτ2 + E Xτ

Z

t

AXs2 ds



τ

Substituting (II.10) and (II.11) into (II.9), we have
 

 1
1 −ρτ
2
−ρT
−ρT
σ
e
−e
− (T − τ )e
(II.12)
ρ2
ρ

e 2
2 1 −ρτ
−ρT
+[(αXτ + aπτ ) + σu ] (e
−e ) .
ρ

θ
1
g(τ, Xτ ) =
2 1 + a2 θ
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Note that, if we define
f1 (s, Xt ) = −f (s, Xt ),
g1 (s, Xτ ) = −g(s, Xτ ) + M ≥ 0,
then the loss minimization problem in (II.6) can be reduced to the following
maximization problem: Find τ ∗ such that
G∗0 (x)

=

sup E

x

τ ∈[0,T ]

=

Z

τ


[−f (t, Xt )] dt − g(τ, Xτ ) + M

0

sup E

x

τ ∈[0,T ]

Z

τ


f1 (t, Xt )dt + g1 (τ, Xτ ) .

(II.13)

0

In the following, we will use the optimal stopping approach to solve the
optimization problem (II.13).

3. Solving the Optimal Stopping Problem
In order to solve the government’s optimization problem (II.13) by using
a standard framework of the optimal stopping problem involving an integral
(cf. Øksendal [27]), we make the following transformations: Let
Z

τ

f1 (t, Xt )dt + w,

Wτ =

w∈R

0
(s,x,w)

and define the Ito diffusion Zt = Zt




Zt = 



in R3 by

s+t 

Xt 


Wt
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for t ≥ 0. Then
 

1
 dt  

 
 
dZt = 
0
 dXt  = 

 
dWt
− 12 θe−ρt (Xt − k)2








 0 

 
 dt+  σ  dBt ,

 

 
0

Z0 = (s, x, w).

So Zt is an Ito diffusion starting at z := Z0 = (s, x, w). Let Rz = R(s,x,w) denote the probability law of {Zt } and let E z = E (s,x,w) denote the expectation
with respect to Rz . In terms of Zt the problem (II.13) can be written
G∗0 (x) = G∗ (0, x, 0) = sup E (0,x,0) [Wτ + g1 (τ, Xτ )] = sup E (0,x,0) [G(Zτ )]
τ

which is a special case of the problem
G∗ (s, x, w) = sup E (s,x,w) [Wτ + g1 (τ, Xτ )] = sup E (s,x,w) [G(Zτ )]
τ

with
G(z) = G(s, x, w) := w + g1 (s, x).
Then, for
1
f1 (s, x) = − θe−ρ·s (αx − us )2
2
 

 1
1
θ
1 −ρs
−ρT
2
−ρT
g1 (s, x) = −
σ
e
−e
− (T − s)e
2 1 + a2 θ
ρ2
ρ


1
+M
+ [(αx + aπse )2 + σu2 ] e−ρs − e−ρT
ρ
and
G(s, x, w) = w + g1 (s, x),
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the AZ of Zt is given by
∂G 1 2 ∂ 2 G 1 −ρs
∂G
+ σ
− θe (x − k)2
2
∂s
2 ∂x
2
∂w
θ
1
1
[(αx + aπse )2 + σu2 ]e−ρs − θ(αx − us )2 e−ρs .(II.14)
=
2
21+a θ
2

AZ G =

Let
U = {(s, x, w) : G(s, x, w) < G∗ (s, x, w)}
and
V = {(s, x, w) : AG(x) > 0} .
Then, by (II.14) we have
V

= {(s, x, w) : AZ G(s, x, w) > 0}

(II.15)

= R × {x : (αx + aπse )2 + σu2 > (1 + a2 θ)(αx − us )2 } × R.
Remark B.1. Øksendal [27] shows that: V ⊂ U , which means that it is
never optimal to stop the process before it exits from V . If we choose a
suitable π e (x) such that (αx + aπse )2 + σu2 > (1 + a2 θ)(αx − us )2 , then we have
U = V = R3 . Therefore, any stopping time less T will not be optimal for all
(s, x, w) ∈ V , and thus τ ∗ = T is the optimal stopping time. We will use this
fact to study the time inconsistency problem of the monetary policygame in
the following sections.
Remark B.2. If ρ → ∞, then AZ G → 0, it is optimal to use the cheating policyfor the government. If ρ < ∞, the term in equation (II.14),
1
θ
[(αx
2 1+a2 θ

+ aπse )2 + σu2 ]e−ρs can be regarded as the marginal benefit of not

stopping zero inflation policy and the term, 12 θ(αx − us )2 e−ρs , is the marginal
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cost. Since the government put the same weight(e−ρs ) on the marginal benefit and the marginal cost, so when he compares this two terms, the discount
factor ρ will not effect his decision.
dL(x)
dτ

Remark B.3. In fact, we can verify directly that

< 0 when π e is bigger

enough, where L(x) is defined by
L(x) = E

x

Z

τ

Z

x
f (t, Xt )dt + g(τ, Xτ ) = E

0

τ


f (t, Xt )dt + g(τ Xτ ) .

0

Thus, τ ∗ = T is the time.

C. The Equilibrium Behavior of the Monetary Policy Game
In order to study the equilibrium behavior of the game, we first give the
following lemma that shows that the government will keep the zero-inflation
policy when the public uses trigger strategies and reputation penalties imposed by the public are large enough.
Lemma C.1. Let τ = inf{s > 0 : πs 6= 0}. Then, for all x, any trigger
strategy






e
πt =






of the public, {πte (x)}, which has the form of
0

if t = 0

0

if 0 < t < τ

π e (x) ∈ {h : (αx + aπse )2 + σu2 > (1 + a2 θ)(α|x| + M )2 } if t > s and t ≥ τ

discourages the policymaker from attempting surprise inflation.
Proof. For each x ∈ R, if we choose any π e ∈ {h : (αx + aπse )2 + σu2 >
(1 + a2 θ)(αx − us )2 }, we have
(αx + aπse )2 + σu2 > (1 + a2 θ)(αx − us )2

for all x ∈ R.

,
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Then, V in (II.15) becomes V = R3 , and thus any stopping time less T is
not optimal for the government. Hence, τ ∗ = T . Thus, when the public
applies this trigger strategy, it is never optimal for government to stop the
zero-inflation policy.
Although there are (infinitely) many trigger strategies given in Lemma 1
that can discourage the policymaker from attempting surprise inflation, most
of them are not optimal for the public in terms of minimizing the public’s
expected inflation error: πt −πte . To rule out the those non-optimal strategies,
we have to impose some assumptions how the public form an expectation
and what an equilibrium solution should be used to describe the public’s
self-interested behavior. Different assumptions on the public’s behavior may
result in different the optimal solutions. In the following, we introduce two
types of sequentially rational equilibrium solution concepts.
Suppose the government knows the distribution of the natural rate, Xt ,
exactly, that is,
dPeG = dP,
where PeG is the belief of the government for the movement of the shock, P
is the measure of the natural rate.
We suppose that the public does not know the distribution of the natural
rate, but it’s belief PeP is absolutely continuous with respect to P 4 , which
means that if an event does not occur in probability, then the public will
believe that this event will not happen.
Then, by Randon-Nikodym Theorem (Lipster & Shiryaev [22]), there
4

PeP (A) = 0 for each A ∈ Ft , such that P (A) = 0.

20

exist Randon-Nikodym derivatives, M (t), such that
dPeP = M (t)dP, (a.s.),
and M (t) is a martingale and bounded from above and below (i.e. M1 ≤
M (t) ≤ M2 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T ). This means that, whenever new information
becomes available, the belief of the public is adjusted. We can interpreter
M (t) is the information structure of the society, it is a measurement of how
the public knows the real natural rate.
We suppose that M (t) is P-square-integrable and Xt is PeP -integrable.
We also suppose that hXt , M (t)i = 05 , heuristically, this assumption can be
interpreted as: the history of the natural rate can’t help the public to predict
the movement of the future natural rate in generally.6
e the expectation operator with respect to PeP .
We denote by E
A strategy (τ, {πt , πte }) is said to be a sequentially rational equilibrium
strategy for the dynamic model defined above if
(1) the belief of the public for the movement of the natural rate
Xt , PeP , satisfies Bayes’ rule:
e t |Fs ] =
E[X

1
E[Xt M (t)|Fs ]
M (s)

(II.16)

for all s < t;
5

hX, YP
i is cross-variation, which is defined by hXt , Yt i
lim||Π||→0 1≤k≤m (Xt(k) − Xt(k−1) )(Yt(k) − Yt(k−1) ), where Xt and Yt
square-integrable, and Π = [t0 , t1 , ..., tm ] is a partition of [0,t].
6
Note that, if one assumes that the public knows the distributions of
shocks, Xt , exactly, then M (t) = 1. This is a usual assumption made in
literature.

=
are
the
the
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(2) The expectation of the public is rational: πte = E Xs πtD :=
e tD |Fs ] for all s < t;
E[π
(3) it optimizes the objectives of the public and the government.
Now we use this type of sequentially rational equilibria to study the time
consistency problem in monetary policy. Proposition C.2 below shows the
existence of such equilibria.
Proposition C.2. Suppose the shocks {Xt } satisfy the inequality:
(αx + a2 θαXt )2 + σu2 > (1 + a2 θ)(α|x| + M )2 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ R .
(II.17)
Let (τ, {πs }) be the strategy of the government, where τ is the first time that
the government changes its policy from zero-inflation to discretion rule, i.e.,
τ = inf{s > 0 : πs 6= 0}. Let the strategy of the public {(πte )} be given by



0
if t = 0



πte =
0
if 0 < t < τ .




 aθαXτ if t ≥ τ
Then, (τ ∗ , {πt∗ , πte∗ }) with τ ∗ = T , πt∗ = 0 and πte∗ = 0 for all t ≥ 0 is a
sequentially rational equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public.
Proof. To prove (τ, {πt , πte }) defined above results in a sequentially rational
equilibrium, τ ∗ = T , πt∗ = 0 and πte∗ = 0 for all t ≥ 0, we need to show
that (1) it satisfies Bayes’ rule, (2) the rational expectation condition holds:
e D |Fτ ], (3) π e ∈ {h : (αx + ah)2 + σ 2 > (1 + a2 θ)(α|x| +
πte = E Xτ πtD := E[π
t
t
u
M )2 }, and (4) (τ ∗ , {πt∗ , πte∗ }) optimizes the objectives of the public and the
government.
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We first claim that the public updates its belief by Bayes’ rule. Indeed,
since M (t) is a martingale and, for s < t, Xt is a PeP -integrable random
variable, then, by Lemma of Shiryaev & Kruzhilin [38], the Bayes’ Rule
holds:
e t |Fs ] =
E[X

1
E[Xt M (t)|Fs ].
M (s)

To show πte = E Xτ πtD , first note that Xt and M (t) are square-integrable
martingale, using the fact that Xt M (t) − hXt , M (t)i is a martingale (Karatzas
& Shreve [17]) and the assumption hXt , M (t)i = 0, We can get that Xt M (t)
is a martingale, by Bayes’ rule:
e t |Fτ ] =
E[X

1
1
E[Xt M (t)|Fτ ] =
Xτ M (τ ) = Xτ .
M (τ )
M (τ )

which means {Xt } is also a martingale under PeP . Since the policymaker’s
best response function is given by
πtD =

aθ
(aπte + αx − us ),
1 + a2 θ

{Xt } is a martingale under PeP , and πte = aθαXτ is complete information at
time t, we have
aθ
(aπte + αx − us )
1 + a2 θ
aθ
=
(aπte + αE Xτ Xt )
2
1+a θ
aθ
=
(aπte + αXτ ).
1 + a2 θ

E Xτ πtD = E Xτ

Substituting πte = aθαXτ into (II.18), we have E Xτ πtD =

(II.18)
aθ
[a2 θαXτ
1+a2 θ

+

αXτ ) = aθαXτ = πte .
Now, if condition (II.17) is satisfied, we have (αx + aπse )2 + σu2 > (1 +
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a2 θ)(α|x| + M )2 and thus πte ∈ {h : (αx + ah)2 + σu2 > (1 + a2 θ)(α|x| + M )2 }
for all x ∈ R with x 6= k. Then, by Lemma 1, and the time is τ ∗ = T .
Therefore, we must have πt∗ = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Since the public only cares about his inflation prediction errors, so πte =
aθαXt minimizes the public’s expected loss when the policy change occurs
at time t in this game. Hence, if both the policymaker and public believe
that future shocks will grow enough to make the inequality (II.17) hold, the
threat of the public is credible. Hence, we must have πte∗ = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]
since τ ∗ = T . Thus, we have shown that the trigger strategies (τ, {πt , πte })
result in a sequentially rational equilibrium, which is τ ∗ = T , πt∗ = 0, and
πte∗ = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Thus, Proposition C.2 implies that, as long as natural rate Xt is big
enough, the public can use a trigger strategy to induce a zero-inflation sequentially rational equilibrium. Of course, the assumption that (αx+aπse )2 +σu2 >
(1 + a2 θ)(α|x| + M )2 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ R with x 6= k seems very
strong. Proposition D.1 in the next section shows that this is a reasonable
assumption. As long as this inequality holds for the initial natural rate x,
the public and the government will have a strong belief that it will be true
for all t ∈ (0, T ] and x ∈ R.

D. Stochastically Stable Equilibrium
In this section we study the robustness of sequentially rational equilibrium. In order to get the sequentially rational equilibrium in Proposition C.2, we imposed the assumption that B = {(αx + a2 θαXt )2 + σu2 >
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(1 + a2 θ)(α|x| + M )2 } for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ R. It seems that the
concept of sequentially rational equilibrium is not satisfactory as a predictor of long-run behavior when the game is subjected to persistent stochastic
shocks. So we introduce the concept of sequentially rational stochastically
stable equilibrium7 .
Definition D.1. Let {A : (y, z ∈ R2 )} be the set of sequentially rational equilibrium of a dynamic game under the shock Xt , we say A is a sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium if E x [τ ] = ∞, where
τ = inf{t : (yt , zt ) ∈
/ A}, and A is a sequentially stochastically unstable
rational equilibrium if E x [τ ] < ∞.
Loosely speaking, the sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibria of a dynamic game are those equilibria such that the expected time to
depart from them is infinite.
Lemma D.1. Let B = {Xt : (αx + a2 θαXt )2 + σu2 > (1 + a2 θ)(α|x| + M )2
for t ≥ 0}, and let η = inf{t > 0 : Xt ∈
/ B} be the first time Xt exits from
B. Suppose that x ∈ B. Then, we have
E x [η] = ∞
for all x ∈ R.
7

In determinate dynamic systems, in order to analyze the dynamic behavior, the concepts of Lyapunov stable and asymptotically stable are always
used. For stochastic evolution system, Foster and Young [10] and Young [44]
first introduce the concept of stochastic stability. But the concept in their
paper is different from ours.
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Proof. Solving (αx + a2 θαXt )2 + σu2 > (1 + a2 θ)(x − ut )2 for Xt , we have
Xt >

i
√
1 h 2
2 θ(α|x| + M )
−
αx
+
−σ
1
+
a
u
a2 θα

or
i
√
1 h
2
2
(−σu − αx − 1 + a θ(α|x| + M ) .
Xt < 2
a θα
√


Let C = a21θα ut − αx + 1 + a2 θ(α|x| + M )
√


and D = a21θα (ut − αx − 1 + a2 θ(α|x| + M ) .
Since X0 = x ∈ B for all x ∈ R, there are two cases to be considered:
(1) x > C and (2) x < D.
Case 1. x > C. Let ηc = inf{t > 0: Xt ≤ C}, and let ηn be the first
exit time from the interval
{Xt : C ≤ Xt ≤ n}
for all integers n with n > C. We first show that P x (Xηn = C) =
P x (Xηn = n) =

x−C
.
n−C

n−x
n−C

and

Consider function h ∈ C02 (R) defined by h(x) = x for

C ≤ x ≤ n (C02 (R) means the functions in C 2 (R) with compact support in
R). By Dynkin’s formula,
x

E [h(Xηn )] = h(x) + E

x

Z

ηn


Ah(Xs )ds = h(x) = x,

0

we have
CP x (Xηn = C) + nP x (Xηn = n) = x.
Thus,
P x (Xηn = C) =

n−x
n−C

(II.19)
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and
P x (Xηn = n) = 1 − P x (Xηn = C) =

x−C
.
n−C

Now consider h ∈ C02 (R) such that h(x) = x2 for C ≤ x ≤ n. Applying
Dynkin’s formula again, we have
x

E [h(Xηn )] = h(x) + E

x

Z

ηn


Ah(Xs )ds = x2 + σ 2 E x [ηn ] ,

(II.20)

0

and thus
σ 2 E x [ηn ] = C 2 P x (Xηn = C) + n2 P x (Xηn = n) − x2 .
Hence, we have


1
2x − C
2
2n−x
E [ηn ] = 2 C
+n
−x .
σ
n−C
n−C
x

Letting n → ∞, we conclude that P x (Xηn = n) =

x−C
n−C

→ 0 and ηc =

lim ηn < ∞ a.s. Therefore, we have
E x [ηc ] = lim E x [ηn ] = ∞.
n→∞

Case 2. X0 = x < D. Define ηD = inf{t > 0; Xt ≥ D}. Let ηn be the
first exit time from the interval
{Xt : −n ≤ Xt ≤ D}
for all integers n with −n < D. By the same method, we can prove that


1
2 n+x
2D − x
2
E [ηn ] = 2 D
+n
−x .
σ
n+D
n+D
x

Letting n → ∞, we conclude that P x (Xηn = n) =

D−x
n+D

→ 0 and
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ηD = lim ηn < ∞ a.s., and thus
E x [ηD ] = lim E x [ηn ] = ∞.
n→∞

Thus, in either case, we have E x [η] = ∞.
Lemma D.1 thus implies that, because the expected exit time from B
is infinite since the expectation E x [η] = ∞ for all x ∈ R with x 6= k,
the policymaker will have the belief that the future natural rate will stay
in B forever, and consequently they will likely make decisions and behave
according to this belief. As a result, the sequentially rational equilibrium
will likely appear in the game when the public has the same belief as the
government. So, in this sense, we can regard the class B as an absorbing
class for Xt as long as x ∈ B.
What happens if the initial shock x is not in B? We have following
proposition:
Lemma D.2. Define τ = inf{t > 0 : Zt ∈ B}. Then for x ∈
/ B, i.e.,
a(1 − θ) ≥ 2, we have
E x [τ ] =

a(1 − θ) − 2
(k − x)2
σ 2 aθ

for all D ≤ x ≤ C.
Proof. Since x 6∈ B, we have D ≤ x ≤ C. Define τC = inf{t > 0 : Xt ≥ C}
and τD = inf{t > 0 : Xt ≤ D}. Then τ = τc ∧ τD := min{τc , τD }. We
first show that P x (Xτ = C) =

x−D
C−D

and P x (Xτ = D) =

C−x
.
C−D

Consider
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h ∈ C02 (R) such that h(x) = x for D ≤ x ≤ C. By Dynkin’s formula,
x

E [h(Xτc ∧τD )] = h(x) + E

x

τc ∧τD

Z


Ah(Xs )ds = h(x) = x,

(II.21)

0

we have
CP x (Xτ = C) + DP x (Xτ = D) = x.
Thus,
P x (Xτ = C) =

x−D
.
C −D

and thus
P x (Xτ = D) = 1 − P x (Xτ = C) =

C −x
.
C −D

Now consider h ∈ C02 (R) such that h(x) = x2 for D ≤ x ≤ C. By
Dynkin’s formula:
Z
E [h(Xτc ∧τD )] = h(x)+E [
x

x

τc ΛτD

Ah(Xs )ds] = h(x)+σ 2 E x [τc ∧τD ], (II.22)

0

we have
σ 2 E x [τc ∧ τD ] = C 2 P x (Xτ = C) + D2 P x (Xτ = D) − x2
and thus
E x [τc ∧ τD ] =

a(1 − θ) − 2
(k − x)2 ≥ 0.
σ 2 aθ

(II.23)

by noting that a(1 − θ) ≥ 2.
Notice that, from (II.23), one can see that, the bigger the variance of
the natural rate (measured by σ), the faster the convergence rate. In particular, if σ 2 → 0, E x [τc ∧ τD ] → ∞ and Ẽ x [τc ∧ τD ] = E x [M (t)(τc ∧ τD )] ≥
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M1 E x [τc ∧ τD ] → ∞. This means that, when the natural rate {Xt } degenerates to a non-stochastic process, the government and the public will believe
that Xt 6∈ B for all t ∈ [0, T ], and thus a stationary sequentially strong
rational equilibrium does not exist. On the other hand, if σ 2 → ∞, then
E x [τc ∧ τD ] → 0 and Ẽ x [τc ∧ τD ] = E x [M (t)(τc ∧ τD )] ≤ M2 E x [τc ∧ τD ] →
0 . This means that, when the variance of the natural rate {Xt } becomes
very large, the public and the government may believe that Xt will be in B
for t ∈ (0, T ]. As such, the policymaker and the public will likely have the
beliefs that the natural rate Xt will be in B right after the initial natural rate
x, and consequently, the stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium
will likely appear in the time horizon (0, T ].
When 0 < σ < ∞, from Lemma D.2, the expected time of entering
B, E x [τ ] = E x [τc ∧ τD ] is a finite number. Suppose the public has the
same belief as the government. There are two cases to be considered: (1)
E x [τ ] ≥ T . In this case, the government and the public likely believe that
Xt 6∈ B for all t ∈ [0, T ], and thus a stationary sequentially strong rational
equilibrium will not likely exist. (2) E x [τ ] < T . In this case, we should
not expect the zero-inflation stationary monetary policy for the time period
between [0, E x [τ ]] since Xt 6∈ B for all t ∈ [0, E x [τ ]]. However, once Xt enters
B at the first time E x [τ ], we can regard Xτ as a new starting point. Then,
by Lemma D.1, the policymaker and the public will believe Xt will stay in
B for all t ∈ [E x [τ ], T ], and thus we can expect to have a non-zero inflation
stationary monetary policy on [E x [τ ], T ]. This implies that, although we do
not have a time consistency policy on the whole time horizon [0, T ] when
x 6∈ B, we could have a time consistency monetary policy beyond the point
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E x [τ ]. In other words, one will have an nonstationary policy period if the
initial shock x 6∈ B, however, after a certain point τ , the monetary policy
may become stationary. Thus, the time inconsistency can happen at most
once.
Summarizing the above discussion, we can draw the following conclusions:
(i) If the initial natural rate x is in the class B, one can expect
all future shocks Xt are in B and thus can expect a stationary
zero-inflation outcome by the sequentially rational behavior.
(ii) If the initial natural rate x is not in the class B, whether or
not we can expect the monetary policy to have a tendency to
become stable depends on T , the lifetime of the government.
If the expected first entry time to B, E x [τ ] is greater than
the lifetime of the government, we do not expect a stationary monetary policy and thus we have the time inconsistency
problem. If the first entering time into B, E x [τ ] is less than
the lifetime of the government, we may expect a stationary
monetary policy beyond the entry point E x [τ ], and monetary
policy becomes stationary. Thus, the monetary policy can
jump at most once.
Combine LemmaD.1 and LemmaD.2, we have following proposition:
Proposition D.3. Let (τ, {πs }) be the strategy of the government, where τ
is the first time that the government changes its policy from zero-inflation to
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discretion rule, i.e., τ = inf{s > 0 : πs 6= 0}. Let the strategy of the public
{(πte )} be given by



0
if t = 0



πte =
0
if 0 < t < τ .




 aθ(k − Xτ ) if t ≥ τ
Then, (τ ∗ , {πt∗ , πte∗ }) with τ ∗ = T , πt∗ = 0 and πte∗ = 0 for all t ≥ 0 is a
sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public.
Then, we can see that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium and the
uncooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation
monetary policies are inherently more stable than the discretionary rules,
and once established, they tend to persist for longer periods of the time.
Thus, for this continuous time dynamic stochastic game, sequentially strong
rational stochastically stable equilibrium behavior can be predicted for any
initial natural rate.

E. Conclusion
This chapter develops a model to examine the equilibrium behavior of
monetary time inconsistency problem in a continuous time economy with
stochastic natural rate and endogenized distortion. First, we introduce the
notion of sequentially rational equilibrium, and show that the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies in a stochastic
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setting. We provide the conditions for the existence of sequentially rational
equilibrium. Then the concept of sequentially rational stochastically stable
equilibrium is introduced. We compare the relative stability between, of
so=called the cooperative behavior, with so-called uncooperative behavior,
and show that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a
sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncooperative
equilibrium in this monetary policy game is sequentially rational stochastically stable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation monetary policies
are inherently more stable than the discretion rules, and once established,
they tend to persist for longer periods of the time.
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CHAPTER III

REPUTATION AND OPTIMAL CONTRACT FOR CENTRAL
BANKERS: A UNIFIED APPROACH
This chapter studies the time inconsistency problem on monetary policy
for central banks using a unified approach that combines reputation forces
and contracts. We first characterize the conditions for reputation forces to
eliminate the inflation bias of discretionary policy. We then propose an optimal contract that can be used with reputation forces to implement a desired
socially optimal monetary policy rule when the reputation forces alone are
not large enough to discourage a central bank to use a surprise inflation
policy. In contrast to most of the existing contracts that are contingent on
realized inflation rates which are in turn contingent on production shocks,
like the standard reputation model, a central banker in our hybrid mechanism
is punished only when she uses a surprise inflation rate. Since the penalty
proposed is the lowest one that discourages the central bank from attempting
to cheat and the sum of the loss, reputation forces, and the penalty for the
central bank to cheat is the same as the loss at the socially optimal inflation
rate, our hybrid mechanism is the most efficient and robust mechanism that
implement the socially optimal monetary policy rule. We also provide a upper bound of the penalty that is be lower than that of the existing contracts
when realized inflation rate is greater than a certain level.
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A. Introduction
The time inconsistency problem is one of the most common problems
that plague economic policy. Even though technologies, preferences, and information are the same at different times, the policymaker’s optimal policy
chosen at time t1 differs from the optimal policy for t1 chosen at t0 . One
can see such a time inconsistency problem exists almost everywhere. For
instance, politicians quite often announce that they will carry out a specific
policy in the future, but then do something else when the time comes.1 It
is well known from Kydland and Prescott [20] and Barro and Gordon [3]
that the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy may appear when a
central bank faces an incentive to expand output above its equilibrium level,
and the monetary policy games between the central bank and the public
may result in inflation bias as a bad Nash equilibrium outcome. The society
experiences a positive average inflation with no systematic improvement in
output performance. Indeed, when the marginal benefit of inflation exceeds
the marginal cost at a low inflation, the central bank will have an incentive
to use a discretionary policy of inflationary bias, and since the public understands that it will do so, the central bank’s announcement of a low inflation
policy will not be credible. The public will expect a positive rate of inflation, and the central bank cannot do better than to fulfill those expectations.
Thus, in order to induce the set of equilibria that lead to desired outcomes,
some methods that increase the marginal cost of the central bank must be
1

In fact, the time consistency problem can be regarded a special case
of the general incentive compatibility problem in the incentive mechanism
design literature.
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used to change the central banker’s incentives.
Since the time inconsistency problem was first noted by Kydland and
Prescott [20], several solutions have been proposed to deal with this problem
in monetary policy. Barro and Gordon [3, 4] were the first to build a game
theoretical model to analyze “reputation” of monetary policy. Backus and
Driffill [2] extended the work of Barro and Gordon to a situation in which
the public is uncertain about the preferences of the government. Persson and
Tabellini [29] gave an excellent summarization of these models. Al-Nowaihi
and Levine [1] discussed reputation equilibrium in the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game. Li and Tian [21] developed a reputation strategic model of
monetary policy with a continuous time horizon. The second solution is built
on the legislative approach. The major contribution in this area was made by
Rogoff [33]. Following the legislative approach of Canzoneri [8] and Garfinkle and Oh [13], Lohmann [23] showed how the welfare effects of Rogoff’s
conservative bankers can be improved by adding an escape clause. The third
solution is based on the incentive contracting approach to monetary policy.
Persson and Tabellini [30], Walsh [41, 42, 43], Svensson [37], Jensen [16], and
Huang and Padilla [15] among many others use this approach.
The basic idea of these three approaches is that if the incentives faced by
a central bank in choosing how much to inflate can be affected by some means,
the inflation bias may be eliminated while still leaving the central bank free
to respond to aggregate output shocks. The insight is that since the inflation
bias reflects the monetary authority underestimating the equilibrium cost of
inflation, the bias can be eliminated if it can internalize an additional penalty
to high realized inflation.
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Walsh [41] was the first to use the contracting approach to investigate
the central banker’s incentive problem. He showed that by tying reward of
the central bank to realized inflation through a simple linear incentive contract, the inflation bias of discretionary policy is eliminated and an optimal
response is achieved. Walsh’s model has then been extended in several directions. Persson and Tabellini [30] showed how the credibility problem may
be resolved by a simple performance contract that imposes a linear penalty
for inflation on the central bank, and argued that this kind of contract has
some resemblance to real-world institutions (also see Beestma and Jensen [5],
Herrendorf and Lockwood [14], and Svensson [37]).
However, a main drawback of the contracting approach in the literature
is that it completely ignores the equilibrium cost of using discretion inflation
rule. The existing contracting models fail to capture the fact that reputation forces can restore credibility or at least reduce the cost of contracts to
some extent. Also, the existing contracting schemes are costly for use than
necessary. For instance, in Walsh’s setting, the government will punish the
central banker by an amount that is proportional to the realized socially optimal monetary policy πtR . Even though a realized inflation rate does not
comes from a surprise inflation, but from a production shock, the central
bank will then be nevertheless penalized. Since a production shock can be
arbitrary large when it is an unbounded random variable, a huge contract
cost will be required for implementing the socially optimal monetary policy
rule although the central bank has no incentive to use a cheating monetary
policy. A central bank is normally financed by the public and making them
pay a pecuniary fine would simply be a reshuffling of tax money.
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In this chapter, we study the time inconsistency for monetary policy by
using a unified approach that combines the reputation effect and contract
effect. The government designs an incentive optimal contract for the central
bank, and simultaneously the public may also be able to punish the central
bank by reputation forces. Each game may involve more than one period
dependent on whether the central banker will cheat, and the game will be
played repeatedly. We assume that the government has complete ability to
commit to the contract he proposes to the central banker. In order to focus
on the nature of the incentives with which the monetary authority should be
faced, like Walsh, we assume that, ex ante, both the government and the central banker share the same preference over inflation and output fluctuations
at each period. This may reflect the outcome of some appointment process
that ensures a similarity of views between the government and the monetary
authority. As in the standard model of the time-inconsistency monetary policy, both the government and the central bank prefer to have a low-inflation
policy. When the reputation force is not big enough, the government then
needs to design an additional incentive compatible contract for the central
bank to ensure that, ex post, the central bank implements a low inflation
policy.
To compare the total loss when the central bank cheats with the social
loss when the central does not cheats, we assume that the central bank’s
objective is to minimize the average expected loss conditional upon the realization of information up to the present. We provide the necessary and
sufficient condition for reputation forces to eliminate the discretionary policy of inflation bias. If the reputation force from the public is large enough
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to discourage central bankers to use a surprise inflation policy, no contract
should be imposed to the central bank. Because the reputation approach
does not make any transfer payment and a central bank is punished (by losing the credibility and thus increasing the social loss) only when she uses a
surprise inflation rate, it is the most efficient way to implement a socially
optimal monetary policy rule, and thus should be the first choice to be used.
However, when reputation forces from the public alone cannot restrain the
central bank from using a cheating rule, then one must impose additional
cost to the central bank such as penalty determined by a contract.
We then show how the government may present an optimal contract
that can be used with reputation forces to give the central bank incentives to
induce a socially optimal policy as a desired equilibrium outcome when the
reputation force from the public alone cannot restrain the central bank from
using a cheating rule. We present a hybrid mechanism that combines reputation forces and penalty threats. Our approach unifies the reputational approach and the contracting approach. It suggests a simple optimal incentive
scheme or institution that discourages the central bank from surprise inflation and gives her enough flexibility to respond to aggregate output shocks.
The length of reputation impact can reduce the penalty cost imposed to the
central bank. As it will be seen, the longer the reputation effect lasts, the
smaller the penalty will be required for discouraging the central bank from
surprise inflation.
Our hybrid mechanism approach differs from the pure contracting approach in the following main aspects. First, the contract part in the hybrid
mechanism will be used only when the reputation mechanism does not work.
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It is well known that the reputation mechanism is the best choice when it
works since no explicit transfer payment is needed, and thus the cost of implementing a socially optimal monetary policy rule is the lowest. In this case,
no contract is needed. If the reputation mechanism does not work, then one
should consider other approaches.
Secondly, even if the reputation forces alone cannot eliminates the central bank’s inflationary bias, it nevertheless can reduce to some extent the
temptation for the central bank to cheat, and thus a contract scheme may
be used together with the reputation forces to solve the central bank’s incentive problem so that the contract cost will be lower. To have such a unified
approach of reputation and contract, the way for the public to form their
expectations in our setting is assumed to be different from the way assumed
in the existing contracting approach. Like the reputation model, we assume
that the public responds the central bank’s cheating to the expected discretion inflation with a lag of one period while the existing contracting approach
assumes that the public responds the central bank’s cheating to the expected
discretion inflation immediately (without any lag of time). This difference of
timing in forming expectations makes our contract differs from the existing
contracts.
Thirdly, unlike many existing contracts such as Walsh’s contract in
which the central banker will be punished as long as the realized inflation
rate is not zero even though it fully results from production shocks and is
out of the central bank’s control, the penalty imposed to the central bank in
our hybrid mechanism is independent of realized production shocks and the
penalty depends only on whether or not she will use a surprise inflation rate,
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i.e., whether or not expected inflation rate is positive. Thus, just like the
existing reputation models, the penalty determined by the both parts of reputation and contract in the hybrid mechanism depends on surprise rate, but
not on the realized inflation rate that may result from some uncontrollable
shocks by the central bank such as production shocks.
Fourthly, the penalty in our hybrid mechanism is bounded for preventing the central bank from cheating. While most of the existing contract
mechanisms are linear in inflation rate and thus the penalty is unbounded,
the penalty function in our approach is quadratic, concave, and continuous
in surprise inflation rate so that the maximum penalty exists. The central
bank can be punished by this upper bound of penalty if she uses a surprise
inflation rate in the cheating set we will specify, and yet, this upper bound of
penalty may give a lower penalty than the existing contracts. For instance,
even if the reputation forces are not taken into account, the penalty is lower
than the penalty determined by Walsh’s contract when a realized inflation
rate is greater than half of the expected optimal cheating rate π̄ C specified
in (III.6).
Fifthly, the penalty is just the difference between temptation and enforcement for any inflation rate that makes the difference positive, and thus
it the lowest penalty that just discourages the central bank from cheating,
and so it reaches a lower bound of penalty payment. Thus, the penalty
payment function specifies the minimum required payment that implements
the socially optimal monetary policy rule, and therefore, the contract is the
most efficient way to implement a socially optimal monetary policy. Hence,
our hybrid mechanism provides both lower bound and upper bounded of the
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penalty which can discourage the central bank from using a surprise inflation
monetary policy rule. Finally, since the sum of the loss, reputation forces,
and the penalty for the central bank to cheat is the same as the social loss
at the optimally socially optimal inflation rate even if there are production
shocks, our optimal contract is a robust mechanism that implements the
socially optimal monetary policy rule.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section B sets up
the model and the time-inconstancy problem faced by the central banker.
Section C considers the dynamic incentives and reputation forces faced by
the central bank, and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for reputation forces to eliminate the discretionary policy of inflation bias. Section D
presents an optimal contract that can be used with reputation forces to give
the central bank incentives to induce a socially optimal policy as a desired
equilibrium outcome when the reputation force from the public alone cannot
restrain the central bank from using a cheating rule. Section E gives the
conclusion.

B. The Setup
1. Economy
As a standard framework in the literature, we consider an economy characterized by the aggregate supply function:
yt − ȳ = a(πt − wt ) + xt

t = 1, 2, 3, ...

(III.1)
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where yt is aggregate output at time t, ȳ is the equilibrium level of output
in absence of supply shocks or unanticipated inflation, πt is the inflation
rate, wt = πte is the rate of growth of nominal wage which is equal to the
public’s inflationary expectations, {xt } are aggregate supply shocks which
are assumed to be identically and independently distributed, with E[xt ] = 0,
var[xt ] = σx2 < ∞ where E is the expectations operator, and a is a positive
constant that represents the effect of a money surprise on output, i.e., the
rate of the output gain from the unanticipated inflation so that the larger is
a, the greater is the central bank’s incentives to inflate.
In order to focus on the nature of the incentives with which the monetary
authority should be faced, we assume that both the government and the
central bank share the same ex ante preference over inflation and output
fluctuations at each period, which is described by a quadratic loss function
of the form:
1
£t = [πt2 + θ(yt − ȳ − k)2 ],
2

(III.2)

where θ is a positive constant that represents the weight the central bank
puts on output expansions relative to inflation stabilization, k is a constant
that can be considered as the amounts of output that excesses the equilibrium
output, and thus ȳ + k is interpreted as the target level of output that the
government and the central bank want to reach. As it will be seen below,
in order to provide an incentive for the policymaker to attempt to create
inflation surprises, k must be positive. Notice that the we have implicitly
assumed that the central bank has a zero target inflation rate. The inflation
term in (III.2) will be replaced by 21 (πt − π ∗ )2 if the central bank has a target
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inflation π ∗ that differs from zero inflation rate.
Substituting (III.1) into (III.2), the loss function becomes
1
£(πt , πte ) = {πt2 + θ[a(πt − πte ) + xt − k]2 } t = 1, 2, 3, ...
2

(III.3)

We assume that the government, the central banker and the public all
know the distribution of the output shocks, but only the central banker
knows the current shock exactly. The government and the public only know
the shocks in previous periods exactly. Thus we can think of the current
output shock xt as private information for the central banker.
2. Three Types of Monetary Policy Rules
First note that, since the objective function is quadratic in inflation rate
πt and output yt that in turn are linear in xt , an optimal inflation policy rule
must be a linear function in xt .2 That is, it belongs to the class
πt = π̄ + a1 xt ,
where π̄ and a1 are constants to be determined. When π̄ > 0, we say the
central bank has a positive inflation bias or uses a surprise inflation rate. a1
represents the effect of production shock on the inflation rate πt . Since the
2

In general, it is useful to distinguish between inflation and the central
bank’s policy instrument, the latter taken to be the rate of growth of a
monetary aggregate directly controlled by the central bank so that inflation
rate is given by πt = mt + νt + µt , where mt is the money growth rate, νt is a
demand (or velocity) shock, and µt is a “control error” in monetary policy.
In this paper, we simplify the stochastic structure by setting νt = µt = 0
without affecting the results in any essential way. With these simplifications,
we have πt = mt and thus we have assumed that the central bank controls
πt directly.

44

central banker knows the shock xt exactly, to determine an optimal inflation
policy rule, the central bank only needs to determine the optimal surprise
inflation rate π̄ and the parameter a1 under various behavior assumptions.
As in Barro and Gordon (1983a), there are three types of monetary policy
rules a central banker may choose.
a. Ideal Rule: Socially Optimal Monetary Policy Rule
In this case, the central bank is assumed to be able to commit herself in
advance to a linear contingent inflation rule subject to the condition that
Eπt = πte . That is, it is assumed that the public believes that the central
bank follows this contingent inflation rule and the central bank does not cheat
by letting actual inflation deviate from the announcement of the inflation
rate. Then πte = E(πt ) = E(π̄ + a1 xt ) = π̄. Substituting πt and πte into the
loss function (III.3) and solving this unconditional expected minimization
aθ
e
problem by choosing π̄ and a1 , we get π̄ = 0 and a1 = − 1+a
2 θ . Then, πt = 0,

and thus the optimal contingent inflation policy rule, denoted by πtR , which
minimizes the value of social loss conditional on the realization of xt and the
constraint that πte = E(πt ) = 0 is given by
πtR = −

aθ
xt ,
1 + a2 θ

(III.4)

and the corresponding expected social loss is given by
1
1
θ
E[£(πtR , EπtR )] = θk 2 +
σ2 ,
2
2 1 + a2 θ x

(III.5)

which is constant for all t by the i.i.d. assumption on xt . This is the benchmark case where the society reaches its desired socially optimal rule πtR . The
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rule, πtR , in this benchmark case was called an ideal rule by Barro and Gordon. (III.5) gives the lowest social loss for implementing this socially optimal
monetary policy rule πtR .
b. Cheating Rule
The monetary policy rule given by (III.4), is not credible if implemented
either directly by the government or by a monetary authority whose objective
function is given by (III.3). When the public expects that the central bank
will use the contingent rule πtR so that the expected inflation rate by the
public is πte = EπtR = 0, then the central bank would like to implement
a positive surprise inflation rate in order to secure some benefits from a
surprise inflation. Indeed, when the central bank chooses an optimal inflation
policy πtC to minimize the value of the loss function (III.3) conditional on
the realization of xt and πte = EπtR = 0 as given, we have
πtC =

aθ
(k − xt ),
1 + a2 θ

(III.6)

and the corresponding expected social loss is:
E[£(πtC , EπtR )] =

θ
1
θ
1
k2 +
σx2 ,
2
2
21+a θ
21+a θ

(III.7)

which is lower than that given by (III.5), and thus the central banker has an
incentive to adopt a cheating monetary policy rule with a surprise inflation
rate given by π̄ C = E(πtC ) =

aθ
k.
1+a2 θ
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c. Discretion Rule
The discretionary rule is defined in the present context as a Nash equilibrium
of a non-cooperative game between the central bank and the public. Under
the assumption of rational expectations, the public will not believe that the
central bank will use the contingent rule πtR so that the expected inflation
by the public is πte 6= 0.3 Thus, the central bank will choose the optimal
discretionary πt = πtD to minimize the value of the loss function (III.3)
conditional on the realization of xt and taking πte as given. The equilibrium
level of inflation is πtD =

a2 θπ e +aθ(k−xt )
1+a2 θ

and thus the expected inflation is

πte = E(πtD ) = aθk > 0 which means that there exists an inflation bias on
average. Thus, the discretionary inflation rule is given by
πtD = aθk −

aθ
xt ,
1 + a2 θ

(III.8)

and the corresponding expected social loss is given by
1
1
θ
E[£(πtD , EπtD )] = θ(1 + a2 θ)k 2 +
σx2 ,
2
2
21+a θ

(III.9)

which reaches a higher expected social loss than the benchmark case given
by (III.5).
As will be seen below, since
E[£(πtC , EπtR )] < E[£(πtR , EπtR )] < E[£(πtD , EπtD )],

(III.10)

the central bank may have the incentives to cheat or deviate from the optimal
3

The assumption of rational expectations implicitly defines the expected
loss function for the public as £p = E[πt − πte ]2 ; given the public’s understanding of the central bank’s choice problem, their choice of πte is optimal.
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policy if the time discount factor is small and as a result, she reaches a
worse noncooperative Nash equilibrium outcome than the benchmark case
if no additional cost is imposed on the central bank. Then, the economy
suffers from a positive bias inflation with an even higher expected social
loss. Thus, we have the time-inconsistency problem, which leads to an nonsocially-optimal monetary policy.
In this case, the central banker needs to be given additional incentives to
implement the desired socially optimal monetary policy (III.4) if the reputation force alone is not large enough to prevent the central bank from cheating.
The main purpose of this paper is to solve this problem by giving an optimal
hybrid mechanism that combines the reputation effect and contract enforcement. To do so, in what follows, we first characterize the conditions under
which the reputation mechanism alone can solve the central bank’s incentive
problem. We then present an optimal incentive compatible hybrid mechanism that eliminates the inflationary bias and, at the same time, has a lowest
contract cost.

C. Reputation Mechanism and Enforcement of Ideal Rule
The idea of the reputation model is that a credible rule comes with some
enforcement power that can reduce an central bank’s temptation to cheat. If
the central bank adopts a higher rate of inflation than people expect, then
they will raise their expectations of future inflation and it results in a higher
inflation in the future and a higher social loss.
The timing of the monetary policy game can be described as follows.
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At the beginning of each period, the central bank announces her inflation
policy rule, and then the public form expectations (or write wage contracts)
based on its belief or lack of belief in the central bank’s announcement. The
output shock is then realized, and finally the central bank chooses an inflation
policy rate that obeys or does not obey her announcement. This process, the
interaction between the central bank and the public, will then be repeated
over time. Thus, this iterative process incorporates notions of reputation
into a repeated-game version of the basic framework.
The public is assumed to use the following behavior strategy in this
repeated monetary policy game to form their expectations. If the central
bank uses the socially optimal monetary policy rule in the previous period,
the public trusts the central bank will continue to use the rule in the current
period, and forms their expectations by this belief which equals πte = EπtR =
0. But, if the central bank departs from the socially optimal monetary rule
R
e
R
,
= Eπt−1
last period by using a cheating rule πt−1 so that Eπt−1 6= πt−1
πt−1

the public then loses their trust and does not expect the central bank to
follow her rule. With a lag of one period (the contract length), the public
D
expects the central bank to pursue the discretionary policy πt+i
, and responds
e
D
to a deviation πt+i
= Eπt+i
= θak for the next P periods where i = 1, . . . , P

and P may be interpreted as the punishment length for the cheating or the
negotiation power over wages of a monopoly union. The punishment length
P is assumed to be exogenously given and fixed.4 The credibility is restored
4

If P is an endogenous variable, there exists a multiplicity of reputational
equilibria that can be supported as subgame-perfect equilibria on the part of
the public sector. Al-Nowaihi and Levine [1] considered this problem with
solution.
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as the P periods punishment. That is, it is assumed that the public has the
following form of expectation mechanism:
πte = EπtR
e
D
πt+i
= Eπt+i

e
R
if Eπt−1 = πt−1
= Eπt−1
e
R
if Eπt−1 6= πt−1
= Eπt−1

(III.11)
(III.12)

for i = 0, 1, . . . , P − 1. Notice that the form of expectations above is different
from the form of expectations used in the contracting literature in which the
public is assumed to respond the central bank’s cheating to the expected
discretion inflation without any lag of time, i.e., πte = Eπt for any period of
time t so that the cheating monetary policy rule πtC does not appear in the
contracting model. This difference of timing in forming expectations makes
our contract differs from the existing contracts.
Accordingly, the central bank can maintains its reputation or credibility
in each period if she wants. On the other hand, if the central bank cheats during period t, the expectations are the ones associated with the discretionary
D
for next P periods. Notice that the assumption of rational expecrule πt+i

tations implies that there is at least one period punishment to the central
banker if she cheats.
The government wants to eliminate the inflation bias of discretionary
policy while still preserving the ability of the central bank to respond to aggregate output shocks. Thus, he wants the central bank to implement the
socially optimal contingent rule πtR for any length of periods. While the reputation game can be repeated independently as many times as desired, it is
assumed that the future is discounted by 0 < β < 1 so that the government’s
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total loss for 1+P periods has present values

PP

i=1

R
R
β i E[£(πt+i
, Eπt+i
)] under

the socially optimal monetary policy rule πtR . For the convenience of discussion, we may consider the average loss, and may also want to discount the
P
time, so the total time having this total loss has the present value Pi=0 β i .
Thus the government’s average expected social loss for the length of P + 1
periods at πtR is given by
P
R
R
X
)]
, Eπt+i
β i E[£(πt+i
1
θ
1
£G =
σ2 .
= θk 2 +
PP
2θ x
i
2
2
1
+
a
i=0 β
i=0

(III.13)

However, the central bank may have a different ex-post average objective
function. Since the central bank’s decision may cheat at any time t, the
central banker’s average expected loss under the cheating is given by
P
D
D
)]
, Eπt+i
Et [£(πt , EπtR ) + Pi=1 β i £(πt+i
λ(πt ) =
PP
i
i=0 β

(III.14)

where Et denotes the expectations conditional upon the realization of all information up to and including period t. This objective function shows that
the central bank has an option to use a discrete monetary policy in period
t when she thinks it is necessary. We now investigate under which conditions, reputation forces will prevent the central bank from using a cheating
monetary policy.
Note that Et (£(πtC , EπtR )) ≤ Et (£(πt , EπtR )) for any linear contingent
inflation rate πt , and thus the central bank does not have any incentive to
cheat at πt if she does not have an incentive to cheat at πtC . So we only need
to consider the loss at the optimal cheating policy πtC .
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Note that

Thus, if

λ(πtR )

λ(πtC )

−

PP

βi ≥

i=1

P
a2 θ 2 k 2 X i
1
= PP
(
).
β −
i
1 + a2 θ
2 i=0 β i=1

1
,
1+a2 θ

(III.15)

then the central bank does not have the in-

centives to cheat or deviate from the socially optimal monetary policy. This
result can be regarded as a version of the folk theorem for infinite-horizon repeated games, which suggests that the central bank has an incentive to cheat
when the discount factor is small. The smaller is β, the larger is the reputaP
tion force P needed. However, when β is too small so that Pi=1 β i < 1+a1 2 θ ,
the reputation force alone cannot solve the central bank’s cheating problem.
P
P
Indeed, when β < 2+a1 2 θ , Pi=1 β i = β 1−β
< 1+a1 2 θ for any P , and thus the
1−β
minimum discount factor for the central bank to keep the socially optimal
monetary policy rule is β =

1
.
2+a2 θ

The intuition behind this is that: if the central bank uses a cheating
policy, she will receive a benefit or gain of Et [£(πtR , EπtR )) − £(πt , EπtR ))]
from reneging arising from the one period before the public can retaliate,
but the public will then retaliate the central bank for P periods and the
P
R
R
D
D
))] which arises from
, Eπt+i
, Eπt+1
)−£(πt+1
penalty will be Pi=1 β i Et [£(πt+1
the P periods of punishment. As in Barro and Gordon, we may call the
benefit of cheating as temptation and the cost of cheating as enforcement
to renege on the socially optimal monetary policy rule πtR . When the enPP
i
D
D
forcement is greater than the temptation, i.e.,
i=1 β Et [£(πt+i , Eπt+i ) −
R
R
£(πt+i
, Eπt+i
))] > Et [£(πtR , EπtR ) − £(πt , EπtR ))], the reputation mechanism

implements the socially optimal contingent monetary policy πtR .
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Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition C.1. For the reputation repeated game of monetary policy between the central bank and the public, there is no inflation bias for any period
P
of time if and only if Pi=1 β i ≥ 1+a1 2 θ , and further the socially optimal monetary policy rule {πt } cannot be supportable for any length of reputation forces
if β <

1
.
2+a2 θ

Note that, when β is large, we only need a small P to keep this inequality
P
held. In particular, when β is close to one, we have Pi=1 β i > 1+a1 2 θ and thus
the central bank does not have an incentive to cheat or deviate from the
optimal policy in any period t for any P ≥ 1. Then, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary C.2. For the reputation repeated game of monetary policy between
the central bank and the public, when β is close to one, there is no inflation
bias for any positive length of reputation.
Hence, reputation forces discourage the central bank from attempting to
cheat and the legal, institution, or contracting constraint on the central bank
is unnecessary and will impose unnecessary contract cost. In particular, all
contracts such those in Walsh are unnecessary for use.
Remark C.1. The conclusion of Corollary C.2 is based on the quadratic
specification of objective function in (III.2). However, as shown in Barro
and Gordon, when the objective function is replaced by the quadratic-linear
objective function
1
£t = [πt2 − θ(yt − ȳ − k)],
2

(III.16)
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the zero average inflation policy rule is no longer supportable by the reputation
mechanism for any discount factor 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 although a non-zero but less
than the discretionary inflation rate may be sustainable. In this case, we need
to adopt other means such as the contracting approach we will discuss below
to solve the central bank’s incentive problem.

D. A Hybrid Mechanism of Optimal Contracts and Reputation
The above proposition shows that, when

PP

i=1

βi <

1
,
1+a2 θ

the reputation

force alone is not large enough to discourage the central bank from surprise
inflation. The repeated monetary policy game between the central bank and
the public yields inflation bias as a bad noncooperative Nash equilibrium
outcome so that the society experiences a positive average inflation without
systematic improvement in output performance and suffering a higher social
loss. The government then needs to step in and may play an important role of
providing an incentive compatible mechanism that induces a desired socially
optimal monetary policy rule. In this section, we use the principal-agent
framework (a simple case of general mechanism design) to determine how
the optimal contract is designed and combined with the reputation punishment together to solve the central bank’s incentive compatibility problem. In
this framework, the principal is the government whose goal is to implement
the socially optimal monetary policy rule πtR , and the agent is the central
bank, to which the government delegates the task of implementing the goal.
In this section, we show that by combining the reputation pressure with an
additional incentive contract, one can induce the central bank to eliminate
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the inflation bias of discretionary policy, and give the central bank the right
incentives to induce the socially optimal monetary policy πtR as a desired
equilibrium outcome. In addition, the hybrid mechanism has the lowest contract cost in the sense that the transfer payment is the lowest to implement
the socially optimal monetary policy for any rate of surprise inflation.
Our hybrid mechanism approach differs from the pure contracting approach in the following main aspects. First, a contract part in the hybrid
mechanism will be used only when the reputation mechanism does not work,
P
i.e., only when Pi=1 β i < 1+a1 2 θ . It is well known that the reputation mechanism is the best choice when it works since no explicit transfer payment is
needed, and thus the cost of implementing a socially optimal monetary policy
rule is the lowest. In this case, no contract is needed. If the reputation mechanism does not work, then one should consider other approaches. Secondly,
even if the reputation forces alone cannot eliminates the central bank’s inflationary bias, it nevertheless can reduce in some extent the temptation for the
central bank to cheating, and thus a contract scheme may be used together
with the reputation forces to solve the central bank’s incentive problem so
that the contract cost will be lower. Thirdly, unlike many existing contracts
such as Walsh’s contract in which the central banker will be punished as
long as the realized inflation rate is not zero even though it fully results from
production shocks, the penalty function for the central bank in our hybrid
mechanism is independent of realized production shocks xt and the penalty
depends only on whether or not she will use a surprise inflation rate, i.e.,
whether or not expected inflation rate π̄ > 0. Fourthly, while most existing contract mechanisms are linear in inflation rate and thus the penalty is
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unbounded, the penalty function in our approach is quadratic, concave, and
continuous in surprise inflation rate so that the maximum penalty exists. Finally, the penalty is just the difference between temptation and enforcement:
P
D
D
R
R
Et [£(πtR , EπtR ) − £(πt , EπtR ))] − Pi=1 β i Et [£(πt+i
, Eπt+i
) − £(πt+i
, Eπt+i
))],
for any πt that makes the difference positive. Thus, the penalty payment
function specifies the minimum required payment that implements the socially optimal monetary policy rule {πtR }.
Now, we formally present the optimal hybrid mechanism below. In the
hybrid mechanism, the central bank receives a penalty payment (which may
be zero) from the government when the central bank uses a surprise inflation
rate π̄ at time t. The payment could be considered as a direct cost of the
central bank or more broadly as legal constraints for the central bank, denoted by W (π̄). Notice that, the penalty function is the function of surprise
inflation, but not a function of the actual inflation rate πt that is given by
πt = π̄ + a1 xx which depends on both surprise inflation rate π̄ and production shock xt . This specification makes our contract be significantly different
from one in Walsh’s model that is linear and depends on the inflation rate
πt which in turn depends on production shock xt .
The problem faced by the government (principal) is to design a penalty
function W (π̄) that makes the central bank have no incentives to cheat and
thus induces the central bank to choose the socially optimal monetary policy
{πtR }, and further minimizes the expected value of the loss
λ(πt , W ) =

£(πt , EπtR ) +

PP

D
D
β i £(πt+i
, Eπt+i
) + W (π̄)
PP
i
i=0 β

i=1

conditional on the realization of xt .

(III.17)
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Like the first term in (III.14), the loss function £(·) is valued at (πt , EπtR ) =
(πt , 0), but not at (πt , Eπt ) when the central bank cheats at the current period t. Notice that this is the main difference between our unified approach
and the existing contracting approach. In the existing contract models, the
public is assumed to respond the central bank’s cheating to the expected
D
discretion inflation Eπt+i
= aθk without any lag of time so that the cheat-

ing monetary policy rule πtC does not appear in the central bank’s objective
function.
When
£(πt , EπtR )

+

P
X

β

i

D
D
£(πt+i
, Eπt+i
)

>

£(πtR , EπtR )

i=1

+

P
X

R
R
β i £(πt+i
, Eπt+i
)

i=1

(III.18)
or equivalently, when enforcement is greater than temptation:
P
X

D
D
R
R
β i Et [£(πt+i
, Eπt+i
) − £(πt+i
, Eπt+i
)] > Et [£(πtR , EπtR ) − £(πt , EπtR )],

i=1

it is more costly for the central bank to use the discretionary policy πt , and
thus she does not have an incentive to cheat. Thus, the reputation mechanism alone cannot solve the central bank’s incentive problem. So we only
P
R
D
D
R
))] <
, Eπt+i
)−£(πt+i
, Eπt+i
need to consider the case where Pi=1 β i Et [£(πt+i
Et [£(πtR , EπtR ) − £(πt , EπtR ))]. Define the set of inflation rates in which the
central bank has an incentive to deviate from the socially optimal monetary
policy rule πtR by
Πt = {πt : A(πt ) < 0}

(III.19)
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where
A(πt ) =

P
X

R
R
D
D
))]
, Eπt+i
) − £(πt+i
, Eπt+i
β i Et [£(πt+i

i=1

−Et [£(πtR , EπtR ) − £(πt , EπtR ))]

(III.20)

which may be called the cheating set at time t. Note that Et [λ(πtR , 0)] =
Et [£(πtR , EπtR )]. The contract W (π̄) implements the optimal policy {πtR } if
Et [λ(πt , W )] ≥ Et [£(πtR , EπtR )] for all πt ∈ Πt and for all t. It is clear that
there are many such contracts which implement the optimal policy {πtR }.
For instance, any W (π̄) that makes Et [λ(πt , W )] ≥ Et [£(πtR )] for all t can be
used as such a contract. Hence, our interest here is to find an optimal one
which has the lowest penalty cost.
Then, we have the following definition about the optimal contract.
Definition D.1. A contract W (π̄) is said to be an optimal contract which
implements the optimal policy {πtR } if it satisfies the following three conditions.
(1) (Incentive Compatibility): Et [λ(πt , W )] ≥ Et [£(πtR , EπtR )] for
any πt ∈ Πt .
(2) (Optimal Choice): πt minimizes Et [λ(πt , W )] for all πt ∈ Πt .
(3) (Efficient Contract): E[λ(πt , W )] = E[£(πtR , EπtR )] for all
π t ∈ Πt .
In the above definition, Condition 1 is known as the incentive compatibility requirement that discourages the central bank deviating from the socially
optimal monetary policy {πtR } so that the central bank’s interest is compatible with the government’s interest. Condition 2 is known as the central
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banker’s rational (optimal) choice condition on monetary policy rule. Condition 3 is known as the efficient contract condition under which the penalty
determined by the contract is the lowest penalty that just discourages the
central bank from cheating, i.e., the sum of the loss at any discretionary
monetary policy rule, reputation forces, and the penalty is exactly equal to
the loss at the socially optimal monetary policy πtR . Notice that Condition
2 is not the same as Condition 3. For instance, when a big constant term
is added into the penalty function W , the central banker’s original optimal
choice on πi remains optimal, but the λ(πt , W ) becomes larger. Also notice
that expectations in the first two conditions are taken conditional on the
realization of xt since, by assumption, it is known by the central bank.
As we mentioned earlier, any optimal monetary policy rule of the central
bank belongs to the class of linear contingent function in xt : πt = π̄ + a1 xt ,
the central bank wants to choose the optimal π̄ and a1 so that πt minimizes
Et [λ(πt , W )] for all πt ∈ Πt . Then the first order conditions for the central
bank’s problem are obtained by differentiating (III.17) with respect to a0 and
π̄, respectively
(1 + θa2 )πt xt + θa(xt − k)xt = 0

(III.21)

and
(1 + θa2 )πt + θa(xt − k) +

∂W (π̄)
= 0.
∂ π̄

(III.22)

Taking the unconditional expectation for equation (III.21) and solving
aθ
for a1 , the optimal a1 is given by a1 = − 1+a
2 θ . Thus, in the hybrid mecha-

nism, the optimal monetary policy rule of the central bank has the form of
aθ
R
πt = π̄ − 1+a
2 θ xt = π̄ + πt , where π̄ is a surprise inflation bias deviating from
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the socially optimal inflation policy rule πtR by the central banker.
aθ
To find out the penalty function W (πt ), substituting πt = π̄ − 1+a
2 θ xt =

π̄ + πtR into (III.22) and solving for

∂W (π̄)
,
∂ π̄

we have

∂W (π̄)
= θak − (1 + θa2 )π̄.
∂ π̄

(III.23)

1
W (π̄) = W 0 + θakπ̄ − (1 + θa2 )π̄ 2 .
2

(III.24)

Thus, we have

To make W (π̄) be the optimal incentive compatible contract, we need
to determine the constant term W 0 so that Et [λ(πt , W ) − £(πtR , EπtR )] ≥ 0
and E[λ(πt , W ) − £(πtR , EπtR )] = 0.
Note that, by substituting W (π̄) into (III.17), we have
λ(πt , W ) −

λ(πtR )

[ 1 (1 + θa2 )π̄ − θak)]π̄ + 21 a2 θ2 k 2
= 2
PP
i
i=0 β
P
P
1 2 2 2
i
0
aθ k
i=1 β + W
2
=
.
PP
i
i=0 β

Then, when W 0 = − 12 a2 θ2 k 2

PP

i=1

PP

i=1

β i + W (π̄)

(III.25)

β i , we have λ(πt , W )) = £(πtR , EπtR ).

Therefore, we have Et [λ(πt , W ) − £(πtR , EπtR )] ≥ 0, which means that W (π̄)
is the optimal contract under which the cost of using a cheating monetary
policy rule πt is the same as the cost for the central bank to use the socially
optimal monetary policy rule. Thus, the central bank cannot benefit from
the cheating, although it is not worse off either.
Thus, the optimal incentive compatible contract that is contingent on
the surprise inflation rate π̄ and discourages the central bank from using the
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discretionary monetary policy rule πt is given by
P

X
1
1
W (π̄) = θakπ̄ − (1 + θa2 )π̄ 2 − a2 θ2 k 2
βi
2
2
i=1

∀ π t ∈ Πt .

(III.26)

The central bank will be penalized by the amount of W (π̄) if she uses a
surprise inflation rate πt ∈ Πt at time t, and will not be penalized if she uses
a socially optimal monetary policy rule πtR or uses a surprise inflation rate
πt which is not in the cheating set Πt .5 Thus, the optimal contract penalty
payment W (π̄) is solely based on whether the central bank uses the surprise
inflation rate π̄, but not based on the inflation rate which in turn depends
on the magnitude of production shocks xt .
To determine the cheating set Πt , note that W (π̄) ≥ 0 if and only if
g1 < π̄ < g2 , where
h √
i
P
i
aθk 1− 1−(1+θa2 ) P
i=1 β
g1 ≡
1+θa2
and
g2 ≡

h √
i
P
i
aθk 1+ 1−(1+θa2 ) P
i=1 β
1+θa2

.

Thus the central banker does not have an incentive to cheat at the
cheating set Πt = [g1 , g2 ] and the optimal contract that implements the
socially optimal monetary policy rule {πtR } can be written as


 θakπ̄ − 1 (1 + θa2 )π̄ 2 − 1 a2 θ2 k 2 PP β i if g1 < π̄ < g2
i=1
2
2
W (π̄) =
.

 0
otherwise
(III.27)
Remark D.1. The term 21 a2 θ2 k 2
5

PP

i=1

β i in the penalty function W (π̄) in

Since the central bank is assumed to be rational, she will never have an
incentive to choose an inflation rate not in Πt , otherwise she will be worse
off.
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(III.27) is the reputation effect. Thus, this hybrid mechanism is the combination of the reputation mechanism and the contract W (π̄). When 1 <
P
(1 + θa2 ) Pi=1 β i , the reputation force is enough to solve the central bank’s
incentive problem by Proposition C.1, and thus no penalty is needed so that
the contract cost is zero.
Remark D.2. The penalty function W (π̄) depends not only on the discount
factor but also the length of reputation P . Furthermore, W (π̄) is a decreasing
function in P , which means the length of the reputation impact from the public
can reduce the contract cost.
Remark D.3. When future is perfectly discounted, i.e., β approaches to
zero, there is no reputation forces imposed on the central bank. In this case,
2θak
the cheating set has a simple form which is given by Πt = (0, 1+θa
2 ), and the

reputation term disappears in the above penalty function. Thus, our hybrid
mechanism becomes a pure contract mechanism that is given by


 θakπ̄ − 1 (1 + θa2 )π̄ 2 if π̄ ∈ (0, 2θak2 )
2
1+θa
W (π̄) =
,

 0
otherwise

(III.28)

which implements the socially optimal monetary policy rule {πtR }. This is
a new contract scheme and is different from the existing contract schemes.
The hybrid mechanism defined in (III.27) is the sum of the reputation forces
P
P
D
R
given by Pi=1 β i [£(πt+i
) − £(πt+i
)] = 21 a2 θ2 k 2 Pi=1 β i and the pure contract
mechanism defined by (III.28).
Remark D.4. Notice that, if the central bank chooses a cheating inflation
rule according to the rule specified by (III.6): πt = πtC =

1
θa(k
1+θa2

− xt ),
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then π̄ C =

1
θak
1+θa2

and thus W (π̄ C ) is given by
P

1 θ 2 a2 k 2
1 2 2 2X i
W (π̄ ) =
β.
aθ k
−
2 1 + θa2 2
i=1
C

(III.29)

In fact, since the penalty function is linear-quadratic (i.e., the first term in the
penalty function is linear and the second term is quadratic), continuous, and
concave in π̄, the maximum penalty will be reached at π̄ C = EπtC =

1
θak.
1+θa2

The intuition behind this is that, since we are looking for the minimal penalty
for the central bank to keep the socially optimal monetary policy πtR for any
level of surprise inflation and the bank’s loss will be minimized at πtC , the
maximum penalty needs to be imposed to make the sum of the loss, the reputation forces, and the penalty as big as the loss at the socially optimal policy
πtR in order for the central bank to have no incentives to cheat. Thus, the
penalty function is an increasing function when π̄ <
ing function when π̄ >

1
θak.
1+θa2

1
θak
1+θa2

and a decreas-

Note that the penalty will be zero when

π̄ ≤ g1 or π̄ ≥ g2 . However, since the sum of the loss and the penalty equals
the loss at the socially optimal monetary policy πtR over the interval (g1 , g2 ),
the central bank does not have the incentives to use a discretionary monetary
policy and thus the optimal contract is robust so that we can allow the price
fluctuations due to measurement error or uncontrollable production shocks.
Remark D.5. The maximum penalty specified in (III.29) gives a upper bound
of penalty when the central bank adopts a surprise inflation rate in the cheating set. One may simply use this upper bound of penalty to punish the central bank when she cheats. That is, the penalty will be equal to this upper
bound and so it is constant for any π̄ = (g1 , g2 ) and zero otherwise. Yet,
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this penalty may be lower than the one determined by Walsh’s penalty function since his payment is continent on observed inflation rate which in turn
is implicitly dependent on production xt that can be arbitrarily larger. Indeed, since Walsh’s penalty is linear which is given by θakπt and our penalty
W (π̄) <

θ 2 a2 k 2
.
2(1+θa2 )

noting that π̄ C =

Then, when πt > π̄ C /2,
θak
.
1+θa2

θ 2 a2 k 2
2(1+θa2 )

= 12 θakπ̄ C < θakπt by

Thus, even if we do not consider the reputation

effect, the penalty from the pure mechanism specified in (III.28) is lower the
penalty in Walsh’s contract when πt > π̄ C /2.
Thus, the optimal contract W (π̄) combined with the reputation enforcement implements the socially optimal monetary policy rule {πtR } given by
(III.4) and has the lowest cost for preventing the central bank from using an
inflation bias of discretionary policy. Also, the total cost for using a cheating
monetary policy under this hybrid mechanism is the same as the social cost
at πtR , and thus the hybrid mechanism is the most efficient way to implement
the socially optimal monetary policy rule πtR . Hence, when the reputation
enforcement alone cannot restrain the central bank from using a cheating
rule, this simple hybrid contingent mechanism may be used.
Summarizing the above discussion we have the following proposition.
Proposition D.1. In the monetary policy repeated game among the public,
the central bank and the government, suppose the reputation enforcement lasts
P
for P periods so that Pi=1 β i < 1+a1 2 θ , and suppose the penalty function W (π̄)
is given by (III.27). Then, the hybrid mechanism is an optimal mechanism
that implements the socially optimal monetary policy rule πtR .
The above results on the optimal contract with the can be illustrated
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by the quadratic and convex curve equation
P

X
1
1
Lβ (π̄) =
β i < 0,
(1 + θa2 )π̄ 2 − θakπ̄ + a2 θ2 k 2
2
2
i=1

(III.30)

which is the difference between the reputation enforcement and the temptation to cheat for πt ∈ Πt . The penalty function is given by the quadratic and
concave curve which is the mirror image (reflection mapping) of Lβ (π̄) for
g1 < π̄ < g2 and equals zero otherwise. The penalty reaches the maximum
while Lβ (π̄) reaches its minimum at π̄ =

θak
.
1+a2 θ

Since W (π̄) + Lβ (π̄) = 0

for all g1 < π̄ < g2 due to their mirror image each other, the penalty for
the central bank to cheat just equals the difference between the temptation
to cheat and the reputation enforcement. When π̄ ≥ g2 or π̄ ≤ g1 , the central banker does not have an incentive to cheat since λ(π̄, 0) is greater than
£(πtR ). Thus, no penalty is necessarily imposed to the central bank.
Thus, our optimal contract has some advantages that the existing contracts do not share. Our approach answers some criticisms for the contracting
approach. One criticism is that the incentive contract is costly to use. In
Walsh’s model, since only the socially optimal monetary policy rule πtR satisfies the first order condition and the linear contract is contingent on πtR
which in turn is contingent on production shocks, the central bank will be
nevertheless penalized even though the central bank has no incentive to use
a cheating monetary policy. Since the production shock xt can be arbitrary
large when xt is an unbounded random variable, a huge contract cost may be
required for implementing a socially optimal monetary policy rule for a very
large production shock. A central bank is normally financed by the public
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and making them pay a pecuniary fine would simply be a reshuffling of tax
money. In our approach, however, a contract penalty will be imposed only
when the reputation forces alone are not big enough to prevent the central
bank from cheating and further she uses an inflation bias of monetary policy
πt ∈ Πt . The magnitude of the penalty is in fact the difference between
the temptation to cheat and the reputation enforcement, and thus it is the
lowest penalty that just discourages the central bank from cheating. Since
the central bank has no incentive to cheat, the penalty is actually zero when
πt = πtR . In addition, since the sum of the social loss, reputation cost, and
contract penalty for the central bank to cheat is the same for any rate of
surprise inflation and just equal the social cost at the socially optimal monetary policy rule πtR , our contract is robust. Thus, our optimal contract is the
most efficient and stable mechanism that implements the socially optimal
monetary policy rule, and at the same time it freely responds to production
shocks.
It may be remarked that, just like an agent in the usual principal-agent
model that satisfies the binding participation constraint, the central banker,
as an agent, is indifferent for both the socially optimal monetary policy rule
πtR and a cheating monetary policy. This, however, may not be a problem.
Since the central bank in any case cannot benefit from using a surprise inflation monetary policy, but more likely she will be hurt by cheating due to the
loss of credibility or pressure of reputation, influence on future promotion,
the central bank will choose the socially optimal monetary policy. Even if
the credibility, reputation pressure, or negative influence on future promotion does not work, one may give the central bank additional (any positive)
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amounts of penalty when she cheats, and then the socially optimal monetary
policy πtR becomes the unique optimal choice to the central banker.
Thus our optimal hybrid mechanism approach suggests that there may
be a simple optimal incentive scheme that can solve the time inconsistency
problem in monetary policy. When the reputation forces alone do not work,
our hybrid mechanism approach presents an optimal contract that has some
nice properties that an existing pure contract mechanism may not share.
In any case, we provide a lower bound of the penalty for the central bank
to implement a socially optimal monetary policy rule. The contract is an
optimal contract that has the lowest cost of implementing the socially optimal
monetary policy rule. The penalty function W depends solely on surprise
inflation rate.
We know that among the approaches that solve the time inconsistency
problem, the “reputation” problem is key. If reputation consideration discourages the central bank from attempting surprise inflation, then legal or
contracting constraints on central bankers are unnecessary and may be harmful. The result in this section, however, suggests that one can reduce the
contract cost of maintaining the stationary inflation policy by combining the
reputation impact with the contracting penalty when the reputation enforcement alone cannot solve the time inconstancy problem.

E. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the time-inconsistency problem for central bankers. When the reputation enforcement from the public is not large
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enough to discourage the central bank to use a surprise inflation policy, a contract can be used together with reputation forces to implement the socially
optimal monetary policy rule. We presented an optimal hybrid mechanism
that combine the reputation approach and contracting approach. This hybrid
mechanism discourages the central bank from surprise inflation and gives her
full flexibility to respond to output shocks.
Our unified approach of reputation and contract has some nice properties
that the existing mechanisms may not share. Our results answer the concern
that using the incentive contract is very costly. The results obtained in
the paper suggest that one can reduce the contract cost of implementing a
socially optimal inflation policy by combining the reputational approach with
the contracting approach if the reputation enforcement alone cannot solve the
time inconstancy problem. Also, unlike the existing optimal contracts, our
contract is only contingent on surprise inflation rate, but not on production
shocks. The central bank will be punished only when she has an incentive
to use an inflation bias of monetary policy. The magnitude of the penalty
is in fact the difference between the temptation to cheat and the lowest
penalty which just discourages the central bank from cheating, and so it
reaches a lower bound of penalty payment. Thus, our hybrid mechanism is
an optimal mechanism that has the lowest cost of implementing the socially
optimal monetary policy rule, and it therefore is the most efficient way to
implement a socially optimal monetary policy. In addition, since the sum of
the loss, reputation forces, and the penalty for the central bank to cheat is the
same as the social loss at the optimally socially optimal inflation rate even if
there are production shocks, our optimal contract is a robust mechanism that
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implements the socially optimal monetary policy rule. We have also provided
a upper bound of penalty that may be lower than the linear contract when
inflation rate is greater than π̄ C /2.
Of course, like the reputation approach, a weakness of our hybrid mechanism is that the penalty is the function of surprise inflation rate, but not
contingent on realized inflation rates. Thus, it imposes a stronger information
requirement to the government than the existing contracts in the literature
since the surprise inflation rate may be hard to be verifiable exactly although
one can estimate easily by various existing econometric methods in the literature. In any case, we can similarly give a hybrid mechanism that combines
reputation forces and a contract that is contingent on realized inflation rates,
but not on surprise rates if one is willing to increase the contract cost.
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CHAPTER IV

BANK CAPITAL REGULATION AND REGULATION HORIZON
In this chapter, we study how to control the risk taking behavior of
banks. First we derive the expected bankruptcy time and the conditional
probability distribution of bankruptcy for a given time. We show that riskshifting behavior will increase the probability of bankruptcy during a given
time. Then we use these results to analyze certain regulation policies and
show that capital requirements alone cannot control the risk-taking behavior
of banks at finite future point in time. We also prove that if we use the
time horizon as an additional instrument, we can control the risk shifting
problem. We give a theoretic explanation for the VaR regulation. Finally,
we discuss the VaR contracts with asymmetric information and show that
VaR contracts can induce the banker to report the real risk of the project.

A. Introduction
As a consequence of the observed instability of banking systems in the last
two decades, various regulation policies have been proposed and enacted. The
Basel Accord (1978) represents a landmark financial agreement for regulation
of commercial bank. Since 1994, more flexible methods of measuring the risk,
Value at Risk (VaR), have been developed and implemented by the major
banks. In an important regulatory innovation, the Basel Committee (1996)
has proposed that such models be used in the determination of capital that
banks must hold to back their securities trading.
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At the same time, the theory of prudential regulation of banking has
received much attention. Rochet [31] studies the consequences of capital regulations on the portfolio choices of commercial bank. Thakor [40], Santos [36]
discuss Basel Accord with a ”Credit Crunch”. Blum [7] analyzes the consequences of more stringent capital requirements in a dynamic framework. On
the second approach, Merton [25, 26] was the first to use a diffusion model
for studying the behavior of commercial bank. Since the diffusion model
can capture the new characters in the last twenty years1 and be tractable,
many economists study the behavior of commercial bank following Merton’s
approach. Mella-Barral, Fries and Perraudin [24] derive the optimal closure rule and bailout policy. Rochet, Decamps and Roger [32] develop of
continuous time model of commercial bank’s behavior and analyze three instruments adopted by Basel Accord. Pages and Santos [28] analyze the impact of depositor-preference laws on the supervisors. Bhattacharya, Plank,
Strobl and Zechner [6] consider a model of optimal bank closure rules with
Possion-distributed audit. The third approach is using asymmetric information theory to understand financial markets and the regulation of these
markets. Risk taking and observability are two forms of moral hazard exist
in financial contracting. As a consequence of shareholders limited liability, bank shareholders might try to influence the return distribution of their
loans to increase their expected payoff at the expense of the depositors. In
a situation of hidden information, the shareholders typically are the persons
1

During the last two decades, in order to make trading profits and hedge
exposure elsewhere in their banking portfolios, banks have greatly increased
their holdings of trading asset, such as bonds, equities, interest rate and
equity derivatives.
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that can observe the risk of their loans at no cost. To the extent that their
payment depends on the risk related regulation policy, they might have an
incentive to understate the risk. This is called observability problem. Merton
[25], Furlong and Keeley [12] first formalize moral hazard in banking. Frexias
and Santomero [11] give an excellent summarization of these models. But all
above model do not consider the time horizon’s affects on risk regulation.
A different approach to bank regulation has its roots in the theory of
gambler’s ruin. Santomero and Vinso [35] use it for measuring the soundness of banking system and they claim that in order to capture the time
dimensionality of the risk we should abandon the simple capital ratio regulation. This is the original ideal of Value at Risk regulation we are using now.
Koehn and Santomero [19] study how to reduce the probability of failure by
reduce the riskiness of the bank portfolio. Kim and Santomero [18] develop a
mean-variance model to investigate the role of bank capital regulation in risk
control. But these models do not allow for the possibilities of moral hazard
and do not consider the incentives for the bank shareholders.
The present chapter is related to the gambler’s ruin problem approach
in a continuous time dynamic context but unlike above models we study the
regulation policy in an asymmetric information framework, and show that
Value at Risk regulation contracts are truthful signaling contracts.
The time at which the bank become insolvent is of obvious important to
the regulator whose goal is a ”safe and sound” banking system. We assume
that regulator has regulation goals in mind that he/she wants to attain within
a stipulated planning period. Two important goals need to be considered:
-The time horizon before the bank assets fall to their insolvent level;
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-The probability of the bank assets fall to their insolvent level, given a
fixed time horizon.
It is important to acknowledge that such goals may not minimize social
loss. However, these goals are reasonable under the situation of banking
regulation. We give the following two reasons for using the probabilistic
model. First, the cost of bank failure is very big and the negative externalities
generated by a bank failure are very difficult to calculate exactly, because the
failure may spread throughout the banking system, amplifying the negative
effects on unrelated intermediaries. So, if we approx the externalities of a
bank failure as a big constant, then minimizing the probability of the bank
failure implies minimizing the social loss. Second, in some situations (such as
economic crisis), keeping the bank from failure may be an overriding concern
to the public regulator. In practice, VaR represents these ideas.
We try to examine the relationship between regulation policies (capital
requirement and VaR), risk-taking and the two regulation goals of the bank.
We study how to control the risk taking behaviors of the bank. First we
get the expected bankruptcy time and conditional probability distribution
of bankruptcy for a given time. We show that the risk-shifting behavior will
increase the probability of bankruptcy during a given time. The higher risk
investments will make higher profit for the shareholders, but they hurt the
depositors.
Then we use these results to analyze the regulation policies and show
that capital requirements alone cannot control the risk taking behaviors of
bank at finite future point in time. We then prove that if one uses the
time horizon as an additional instrument, one can control the risk-shifting
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problem. Thus, we give a theoretic explanation for the VaR regulation.
Finally, we discuss the VaR contracts with asymmetric information and
show that VaR contracts can induce the banker report the real risk of the
project.
We study the model without regulation in section B. In section C we
analyze the two regulation policies: capital requirements and Value at Risk
regulation. The asymmetric information cases are discussed in section D. In
section E, we conclude.

B. The Model without Regulation
1. Bank Shareholder’s Risk-Taking Problem
In our economy, uncertainty is represented by a filtered space (Ω, F, P ),
on which is defined on 1-dimensional Brownian motion B(t). All stochastic
processes are assumed adapted to {Ft }, the filtration generation by B(t). At
the beginning, the bank accepts deposits D and has input of initial capital, x.
Then the bank undertakes risky investments. The evolution of asset values
of the investments Xt follows diffusion processes:
dXti = µXti dt + σi Xti dBt ,

X0 = x,

with

0<x<∞

i = 1, 2, ..., N
(IV.1)

where µ is the drift and σi is the instantaneous standard deviation of the
process with σ1 < σ2 < ... < σN , dBt denotes the increment of a standard
Wiener process. We assume that µ <
2

σi2
2

for i = 1, 2, .., N 2 . This implies

It can be shown that for any x > 0, Xt → 0 a.s., as t → ∞
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that the investment of the bank is risky, because, in a competitive banking
industry, bank closure will always happen in the long run3 .
We assume that the bank manager wants to maximize the shareholders’
profit. So, if he chooses project i as the investment, his objective function
can be described by the following:
x

Z

B(x, σi ) = E [

τ

e−ρ t (Xti − rD)dt]

(IV.2)

0

where ρ is the discount factor with µ < ρ < 1, r is the interests earned by
depositors and x > rD and D > 04 . τ = inf{t ≥ 0, Xti ≤ x∗i }, x∗i is the
value for which the shareholders choose to declare bankruptcy. Here and in
the following E x denotes the expectation w.r.t. the probability measure Qx .
We define the value of bank equity is the present conditional expected profit
in the future. Then we have following lemma
Lemma B.1. The value of bank equity is
B(x, σi ) = (

x
rD
rD
x∗
x
−
)+[
−
]( ∗ )m2i
ρ−µ
ρ
ρ
ρ − µ xi

where, m2i is the negative root of m2 + ( 2σµ2 − 1)m −
i

2ρ
σi2

= 0, and x∗i =

−m2i ρ−µ
rD.
1−m2i ρ

Proof. By Dirichlet-Poission Theorem (Øksendal Theorem 9.3.3 [27]), we
know that B(x, σi ) is the boundary solution of the
3

5

It can be shown that P robx {Xηi = a} = 1, where a is an arbitrary
constant and η = inf{t ≥ 0, Xti = a}.
4
This is the preliminary condition for the existence of banks
5
Note that we use the Remark in Øksendal [27]
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 −ρB + µx ∂B + 1 σ 2 x2 ∂ 2 B2 = −(x − rD) f or x0 < x < ∞
∂x
2 i
∂x

 B(x∗i ) = 0
The general solution is
B(x) =

x
rD
−
+ A1 xm1i + A2 xm2i
ρ−µ
ρ

where A1 , A2 are arbitrary constants and
s
µ
µ
1
2ρ
1
(j = 1, 2),
mji = − 2 ± ( − 2 )2 + 2
2 σi
2 σi
σi

m2i < 0 < m1i .

First, the boundary condition require a bounded derivative as Xt → ∞, so
we have A1 = 0. Then by the boundary condition B(x∗i ) = 0, we conclude
that the solution of B is
B(x) = (

x
rD
rD
x∗i
x
−
)+[
−
]( ∗ )m2i
ρ−µ
ρ
ρ
ρ − µ xi

Now the shareholders are entitled to choose the bankruptcy-triggering point
x∗i . By the first order condition for B(x), we get
x∗i =

Since

−m2i ρ − µ
rD
1 − m2i ρ

2µ
m2i − σ2ρ4
dm2i
σi4
i
> 0,
=
dσi2
2m2i + 2µ
−
1
σ2

(IV.3)

dx∗i
−1
ρ−µ
dm2i
=
rD 2 < 0,
2
2
dσi
(1 − m2i )
ρ
dσi

(IV.4)

i

and
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then we have
dB
rD
1
x
x
=
ln(
)( ∗ )m2i > 0.
2
dσi
ρ 1 − m2i
xi ∗ xi
dx∗i
dσi2

(IV.5)

< 0 implies that as the risk of the invest increasing, the bank’s

default-triggering value x∗ will decrease. Since default for the deposit is an
irreversible action for the bank, instead of close the bank, waiting for good
movements of the investment is a better choice under high risk situation.
This is consistent with the results in real option literature.
dB
dσi2

> 0 implies that bank manager has the incentives to increase the

shareholders’ payoff at the expense of the depositor. So, at initial time,
the manager will choose project N to invest. This is so-called risk-taking
behavior. We will show that this behavior will make the expected bankruptcy
time horizon of the bank shorter and the probability for the bankruptcy
bigger under certain conditions.

2. The Consequences of the Risk-Taking Problem
In this section, we show that the risk-shifting problem will make the bank
more unstable. First we have the following Lemma
Lemma B.2. If the manager chooses the project i to invest, then the expected
bankruptcy time is
x

E (τ ) =

2ln( xx∗ )
i

σi2

− 2µ

where

τ = inf{t > 0, Xt 6∈ (x∗i , ∞)}

(IV.6)

Proof. From Øksendal (exercise 7.18 (a)[27]), we know for x ∈ (x∗i , R), τ0 =
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inf{t > 0, Xti = x∗i } and τ1 = inf{t > 0, Xt = R}
P rob(τ0 < τ1 ) =

R γ − xγ
,
Rγ − x∗i γ

γ =1−

where

Let f ∈ C02 (R), such that f (x) =

2ln(x)
γσi 2

2µ
σi 2

(IV.7)

+ xγ . Applying Dynkin’s formula

(Øksendal, Theorem 7.4.1[27]) for τR = inf {t > 0, Xt 6∈ (x∗i , R)},
Z
E [f (XτR )] = f (x) + E [
x

x

τR

Af (Xs )ds] =

0

2lnx
+ xγ − E X [τR ]
γσi 2

Then, we have
E x [τR ] =

2lnXτR
2lnx
+ xγ − E x [
+ XτγR ]
2
2
γσi
γσi

Using (IV.7), we get
2lnx
Rγ − xγ 2lnx0i
xγ − x∗i γ 2lnR
γ
∗γ
E [τR ] =
+x − γ
+ xi ) − γ
+ Rγ )
(
(
∗γ
∗γ
2
2
2
γσi
R − xi γσi
R − xi γσi
x

Let R → ∞ and use τR → τ as R → ∞,we get
x

E (τ ) =

2ln( xx∗ )
i

2

σi − 2µ

Since
−2ln( xx∗ )
dE x [τ ]
2
dx∗
=
−
dσi2
(σ 2 − 2µ)2 (σ 2 − 2µ)x∗ dσ 2

(IV.8)

The risk-taking behavior have two sides affects on the expected operation
time of the bank. On the one hand higher risk investments will make the variance increase and decrease the operation time of the bank; on the other hand,
higher risk investment will make the shareholders choose a lower bankruptcy
point, the extend the operation time of the bank.
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Consider now the conditional probability distribution of the bankruptcy
level attained by the bank’s assets in a finite time horizon.
P (x, t) = P rob{infs∈[0,t] Xsi ≤ rD|X0 = x}
Now, we give the following Lemma
Lemma B.3. The Probability that the bank’s assets fall to the bankruptcy
level during time t is
P (x, t)
= 1−

ln( x )+(µ−
N ( x∗ σ √t
i

σi2
)t
2

−

)+e

σ2
2(µ− 2i ) ln( x∗ )
x
σ2
i

− ln( xx∗ )+(µ−
√
N(
σi t

σi2
)t
2

). (IV.9)

where
Z

1
N (x) = √
2π

x

t2

e− 2 dt.

(IV.10)

−∞

Proof. Since Xt is a geometric Brownian motion, we can write ln( Xxt ) as
ln(

σ2
Xt
) = (µ − )t + σdBt
x
2

(IV.11)

Then from Dana and Jeanblanc [9], we have
ln( x∗ ) + (µ −
√
P (x, t) = 1−N ( x
σ t

σ2
)t
2

−

)+e

2
2(µ− σ2 ) ln( x∗ )
x
σ2

2

− ln( xx∗ ) + (µ − σ2 )t
√
N(
).
σ t
(IV.12)

Then, we have
2ln( x∗ )
dP (t, x)
1 ln( x∗ ) + (µ −
√
= 2 √x exp{− ( x
dσi
2
σi t
σi t

σi2
)t 2
2

) } > 0.

(IV.13)

So, the risk-taking behavior will increase the probability of bankruptcy
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during a given time. The higher risk investments will give higher profit for
shareholders, but hurt depositors. So when the banks capital is unregulated, its level reflects only the shareholders’ welfare. As a consequence of
shareholder limited liability, bank shareholders gain from upside risk but are
protected from downside risk. This is a typ of market externality. This
risk-taking behavior necessitates a regulatory response if the safety net is to
remain viable, and the response is normally some form of public regulation
of bank risk-taking behavior.

C. Regulation Policies with Complete Information
1. Regulation with Capital Requirements
The effect of capital requirements have been extensively analyzed in previous literature6 . In this section, we study the effects of capital requirements
on a bank’s expected closure time and the probability of failure during a
given time.
Since a flat Cooke ratio implies z =

x
D

are constants, equation (IV.6)

can be written as
x

E (τ ) =

ρ
2i
ln(z 1−m
)
−m2i r(ρ−µ)

σi2 − 2µ

where

τ = inf {t > 0, Xt 6∈ ((r + p)D, ∞)}

So, we can see that a flat Cooke ratio z cannot eliminate the risk-taking
behavior of the bank.
Assume a regulator sets z(σi2 ) =

−m2i r(ρ−µ) (σi2 −2µ)K
e
,
1−m2i
ρ

where K is the

expected time of the operation of the bank on which the regulator wants to
6

Furlong and Keely [12], Koehn and Santomero [19], Blum [7].
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implement. Then E x [τ ] = K and the expected time of closure of the bank
will be free from the affects due to the risk-taking behavior of the bank.
The probability that the bank’s assets fall to the bankruptcy level during
time t can be written as
P (x, t)
= 1 − N(

σ2
ln(z xD∗ )+(µ− 2i )t

√
σi t

σ2
2(µ− 2i ) ln(z D∗ )
x
−
σ2
i

)+e

− ln(z xD∗ )+(µ−
√
N(
σi t

σi2
)t
2

).

In order to avoid risk-shifting behavior, the regulator may chose z that
the bank’s behavior cannot influence the probability of bankruptcy during
time t. This can be achieved by making the probability P (x, t) independent
of investment risk σi .
So, if z satisfies
−

2(µ −

σi2
) ln(z xD∗ )
2
σi2

= A1

− ln(z xD∗ ) − (µ −
√
σi t

σi2
)t
2

− ln(z xD∗ ) + (µ −
√
σi t

σi2
)t
2

(IV.14)

= A2

(IV.15)

= A3

(IV.16)

and

where A1 , A2 and A3 are constants, the regulator can use the capital requirement z to control the risk taking behavior of the bank during time t. But
it is very difficult to set a capital requirement z that satisfies these three
equations at the same time. Since the capital ratios fail to adjust for the dy-
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namic relationship between book and market values of bank equity, so setting
the Cooke ratios cannot eliminate the effect of risk-taking behavior on the
probability of bankruptcy for a given time horizon. Thus our model suggests
that relying only on a capital requirement cannot rule out the affections the
bank’s risk-taking behavior. This is consistent with the fact that from most
of U.S. history, and certainly for the half-century following the Great Depression, capital requirements tended to be ineffective. More efficient regulatory
rules are needed.
2. Regulation with VaR
In an important regulatory innovation, the Basel Committee has proposed use of the that Value-at-Risk (VaR) model to determine capital requirements that banks must need to back their securities trading.
VaR can be defined as the minimal loss under extraordinary market
circumstance. From its definition, VaR is evaluated under a probabilistic
framework. Let 4X(4t) be the change in value of assets of a bank over a
time period of length 4t. Denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of 4X(4t) by P4X (x). Then the VaR of the asset over a time period 4t
with probability α is defined as:
α = P rob[4X(4t) ≥ V aR]
This definition states that the probability of loss greater than or equal to
VaR over the time horizon 4t is α. VaR regulation demands that, in an
audit, the bank’s safety assets x − x∗ must be at least as high as the α% VaR
for a time horizon of t. So in VaR regulation, both the probability of failure
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and the relevant time period are laid down by the regulator.
From the previous section, we know that in our model we can set
V aR = x − x∗ .
Then we can write equation (IV.9) as:
P (x, t) = 1 − N (
−

+e

ln(1 +

V aR
)
x∗

+ (µ −
√
σi t

σ2
)
2(µ− 2i ) ln(1+ V aR
x∗
σ2
i

N(

σi2
)t
2

− ln(1 +

)
V aR
)
x∗

+ (µ −
√
σi t

σi2
)t
2

).

Given a bankruptcy probability α, we can set V aR such that
−

2(µ −

σi2
) ln(1
2
σi2

+

V aR
)
x∗

= A1

(IV.17)

where A1 is constant. And using the time horizon as another instrument, set
t so that
ln(1 +

V aR
)
x∗

+ (µ −
√
σi t

σi2
)t
2

= A2

(IV.18)
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where A2 is a constant. Then we can derive7
P (x, t) ≤ 1 − N (A2 ) + eA1 N (−A2 ).
Then, given α, the regulator can use the pair (V aR, t) as instruments to
control the risk taking behavior of the bank.
Combine (IV.17) and (IV.18), we can get the following lemma:
Lemma C.1. The audit frequency for VaR regulation contracts, t, should
satisfy
p
A2 ± A22 + 2A1 2
t=(
)
2( σµi − σ2i )

(IV.22)

Proof. Combining (IV.17) and (IV.18), we get
−

σi2 A1
2(µ −

σi2
)
2

+ (µ −

√
σi2
)t = σi tA2 ,
2

and simple algebraic calculations shows that
p
A2 ± A22 + 2A1 2
).
t=(
2( σµi − σ2i )

7

Note that
ln(1 +

V aR
)
x∗

σi2
)t
2

− ln(1 +

V aR
)
x∗

σi2
)t
2

+ (µ −
√
σi t

(IV.23)

(IV.24)

= A2

(IV.19)

= −A2 ,

(IV.20)

implies
− (µ −
√
σi t

Then
− ln(1 +

V aR
)
x∗

+ (µ −
√
σi t

σi2
)t
2

σ2

2(µ − 2i )t
√
= −A2 +
≤ −A2 .
σi t

(IV.21)
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Proposition C.2. The VaR contract {VaR, t} should satisfy
ln(1 +

V aR µ
1
A1
)( 2 − ) =
.
x
σi
2
2

(IV.25)

and
√ µ
A2 −
σi
t( − ) =
σi
2

p

A22 + 2A1
.
2

(IV.26)

Next we examine the properties of E x [τ ]. Since
{infs∈[0,t] Xs ≤ x∗ |X0 = x} = {τ ≤ u|X0 = x}
We have
P {infs∈[0,t] Xs ≤ x∗ |X0 = x} = P {τ ≤ u|X0 = x} = 1 − P {τ > u|X0 = x}
By conditional Markov Inequality,
P {τ > u|X0 = x} ≤

E x [τ ]
u

we get
E x [τ ] ≥ uP {τ > u|X0 = x}
≥ u(1 − P {infs∈[0,t] Xs ≤ x∗ |X0 = x})
= u(1 − P (x, u))
So, given u, if we can control P (x, t), we can also control E x [τ ].

D. Value at Risk Regulation with Asymmetric Information
From the previous section we know that if the regulator is able to observe
the bank’s characteristics ( Dx , µ, σ), then it is possible to control the bank’s
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risk-taking problem. However, in practice it is very difficult to get information on σ. The regulator must try to induce the bank to accurately report
their risk. Otherwise, the bank might misrepresent their risk exposure. In
this section, we study the case of asymmetric information.
The timing of this game can be described by two situations:
Situation 1: first, the banker chooses the project to invest; then he
reports the risk of this project to the regulator; finally, the regulator chooses
the VaR contract.
Situation 2: first the bank reports the risk of this project to the regulator, then the regulator chooses the VaR contract, finally, the banker chooses
the project to invest.
We give the following definition:
Definition: A VaR regulation contract is a truthful signaling contract if
the bank’s choice of risk to report is accurately the risk of the project under
consideration. If the bank does not report the true risk of his investment to
the regulator, we have a pooling contract.
Then, we get the following Proposition.
Proposition D.1. VaR regulation Contracts are truthful signaling contract
for Situation 1 and Situation 2.
Proof. Under the VaR regulation, the shareholders’ objective function will
change to
B(x) = (

rD
rD
x∗
V aR
x
−
)+[
−
](1 + ∗ )m2i
ρ−µ
ρ
ρ
ρ−µ
x

(IV.27)
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and
−

2(µ −

σ2
) ln(1
2
σ2

+

V aR
)
x∗

= A1

(IV.28)

Combine these two equations we get
B(x) = (

rD
rD
x∗
x
−
)+[
−
]e
ρ−µ
ρ
ρ
ρ−µ

A1 m2i
µ
−2
σ2

(IV.29)

We write the risk of the project the banker chooses and the risk he
reports as σc2 and σr2 respectively.
First, we consider Situation 1:
We use backward induction and consider the final stage first. If the
banker has chosen his investment project, before he reports the risk of this
project to the regulator, his indirect utility function can be written as:
rD
rD x∗ (σc2 )
x
2
2
B(x,
σ
,
σ
)
=
(
max
−
)
+
[
−
]e
c
r
σr2
ρ−µ
ρ
ρ
ρ−µ
Since

dB(x,σc2 ,σr2 )
dσr2

2)
A1 m2i (σc
µ
−2
2
σr

(IV.30)

> 0, the bank will choose to report σN , so σr = σN .

Then, we consider the first stage. Before the bank chooses the project
to invest, his indirectly utility function can be written as
2
max
B(x, σc2 , σN
)
2
σc

Since

dB(x)
dσc2

rD
rD x∗ (σc2 )
x
−
)+[
−
]e
=(
ρ−µ
ρ
ρ
ρ−µ

2)
A1 m2i (σc
µ
−2
2
σ
N

(IV.31)

> 0, the bank will choose σN to invest, so σc = σN .

Then we have σc = σr . By definition, we know a VaR regulation contract
is truthful signaling contract.
Next, consider Situation 2:
We consider the final stage first. If he bank has reported the risk of this
project to the regulator and the regulator has chosen the VaR contract, then
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his indirect utility function can be written as:
max
B(x, σc2 , σr2 )
σc2
Since

dB(x,σc2 ,σr2 )
dσc2

x
rD
rD x∗ (σc2 )
=(
−
)+[
−
]e
ρ−µ
ρ
ρ
ρ−µ

2)
A1 m2i (σc
µ
−2
2
σr

(IV.32)

> 0, the bank will choose to report σN , so σc = σN .

Then, we consider the first stage. Before the bank chooses the project
to report, his indirect utility function can be written as
2
x
rD
rD x∗ (σN
)
2
2
)
=
(
,
σ
max
B(x,
σ
−
)
+
[
−
]e
N
c
σr2
ρ−µ
ρ
ρ
ρ−µ

Since

dB(x)
dσr2

2 )
A1 m2i (σN
µ
−2
2
σr

(IV.33)

> 0, the bank will choose σN to invest, so σr = σN .

Then we have σc = σr . By definition, we know the VaR regulation
contract is a truthful signaling contract.
So, the VaR contracts can induce the banker to report the true characters
of the project he invests.

E. Conclusion
In this chapter, we study how to control the risk-taking behavior of a
bank. First we drive the expected bankruptcy time and conditional probability distribution of bankruptcy for a given time. We show that the riskshifting behavior will increase the probability of bankruptcy during a given
time. The higher risk investments will make higher profit for the shareholders, but they hurt the depositors.
Then we use these results to analyze the regulation policies and show
that capital requirements alone can not control the risk taking behaviors of
bank at finite future point in time. We also prove that if we use the time
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horizon as an additional instrument, we can control the risk shifting problem.
So, we give a theoretic explanation for the VaR regulation.
Finally, we discuss the VaR contracts with asymmetric information and
show that VaR contracts can induce the banker report the real risk of the
project.

89

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
This dissertation studies several problems of monetary policy and banking regulation.
Chapter II develops a model to examine the equilibrium behavior of
the time inconsistency problem in a continuous time economy with stochastic nature rate and endogenized distortion. First, we introduce the notion
of sequentially rational equilibrium, and show that the time inconsistency
problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies for stochastic setting. We provide the conditions for the existence of sequentially rational
equilibrium. Then the concept of sequentially rational stochastically stable
equilibrium is introduced. We compare the relative stability between the
cooperative behavior and uncooperative behavior and show that the cooperative equilibrium in this monetary policy game is a sequentially rational
stochastically stable equilibrium and the uncooperative equilibrium in this
monetary policy game is sequentially rational stochastically unstable equilibrium. In the long run, the zero inflation monetary policies are inherently
more stable than the discretion rules, and once established, they tend to
persist for longer periods of the time.
Chapter III studies the time inconsistency problem on monetary policy
for central banks using a unified approach that combines reputation forces
and contracts. We first characterize the conditions for reputation forces to
eliminate the inflation bias of discretionary policy. We then propose an optimal contract that can be used with reputation forces to implement a desired
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socially optimal monetary policy rule when the reputation forces alone are
not large enough to discourage a central bank to use a surprise inflation
policy. In contrast to most of the existing contracts that are contingent on
realized inflation rates which are in turn contingent on production shocks,
like the standard reputation model, a central banker in our hybrid mechanism
is punished only when she uses a surprise inflation rate. Since the penalty
proposed is the lowest one that discourages the central bank from attempting
to cheat and the sum of the loss, reputation forces, and the penalty for the
central bank to cheat is the same as the loss at the socially optimal inflation
rate, our hybrid mechanism is the most efficient and robust mechanism that
implements the socially optimal monetary policy rule. We also provide an
upper bound of the penalty that is lower than that of the existing contracts
when realized inflation rate is greater than a certain level.
Chapter IV studies how to control the risk taking behaviors of the bank.
First we get the expected bankruptcy time and conditional probability distribution of bankruptcy for a given time. We show that the risk-shifting
behavior will increase the probability of bankruptcy during a given time.
Then we use these results to analyze the regulation policies and show that
capital requirements can not control the risk taking behaviors of bank at
finite future point in time. We also prove that if we use the time horizon
as an additional instrument, we can control the risk shifting problem. We
give a theoretic explanation for the VaR regulation. Finally, we discuss the
VaR contracts with asymmetric information and show that VaR contracts
can induce the banker report the real risk of the project.
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